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Abstract
Microblogging is a popular form of Online Social Networking (OSN) activity. It al-
lows users to send out short and succinct messages in a one-to-many publish-subscribe
manner. Most current service providers are centralized and deploy a client-server
model with unencrypted message content. As a consequence, all user behavior can,
by default, be monitored, and censoring based on message content can easily be en-
forced on the server side. Also, the centralized services can be seen as a single point
of failure and can become severely disrupted either by disconnecting the service from
the Internet or by Internet outages. These privacy issues and the susceptibility of the
services to censorship are not only theoretical, but a variety of incidents have shown
that these issues are readily exploited. As a consequence, it would be desirable
if alternative microblogging solutions were available that oﬀer additional privacy
features and which are more resilient to censorship. In this thesis, a distributed,
peer-to-peer based microblogging system consisting of mobile smartphone-equipped
users that exchange messages, encrypted under a group key, in an anonymous and
censorship-resistant manner is proposed, which alleviates the privacy and censorship
issues of most current centralized microblogging architectures. Users conduct peer
synchronizations to exchange messages, i.e., the bidirectional exchange of a prepared
message buﬀer whenever two users are in proximity of each other and able to es-
tablish a direct link using local communication means such as Bluetooth. The way
in which the send buﬀer is ﬁlled with messages is determined by the use of a given
synchronization strategy. To show the feasibility of the proposed microblogging sys-
tem, we experimentally evaluate the message spread with simulations that run on a
wide range of synthetic and real-world mobility inputs. We show that such systems
are working for a range of mobility and network settings, and we evaluate the eﬀects
of using diﬀerent synchronization strategies. In addition to a normal operation of
the network, we also test it under adversarial conditions, e.g., under the presence of
users which jam the network or send spam. Since the message propagation in the
purely peer-to-peer based system is dependent on the mobility the users exhibit as
well as the number of users encountered, which are needed to conduct peer synchro-
nizations, the message spread can be slow to non-existent, if parts of the network are
segmented and users can not exchange messages via peer synchronizations. In such
cases, the devised solution for a higher message spread is facilitated by employing a
server that stores the messages of multiple groups in an Oblivious RAM (ORAM)
data structure which can be accessed by users at their own discretion. On demand,
users read or write their group-encrypted messages obliviously, without the server
getting to know anything about the accesses that took place by the users including
the message accessed or whether the access was a read or write access. In total,
the microblogging solution's use is feasible, but the design decisions required for
anonymity result in a delayed spread of messages on a best eﬀort basis.
Zusammenfassung
Microblogging ist eine beliebte Form der Kommunikation im Bereich der Online
Social Networks (OSN). Es erlaubt den Benutzern kurze, informative Nachrich-
ten an eine Gruppe Interessierter zu versenden. Die meisten zur Zeit existierenden
Diensteanbieter verwenden eine zentralisierte Client-Server-Architektur und versen-
den die Nachrichten unverschlüsselt. Eine sich daraus ergebende Problematik ist,
dass das gesamte Nutzerverhalten überwacht werden kann und dass das serverseitige
Zensieren von Nachrichten einfach durchgeführt werden kann. Zusätzlich ermöglicht
die Zentralisierung des Dienstes Angriﬀsmöglichkeiten gegen die Verfügbarkeit, in-
dem er vom Internet abgetrennt wird oder indem er unerreichbar durch Ausfälle
des Internets wird. Diese angesprochenen Kritikpunkte hinsichtlich Privatheit so-
wie die Anfälligkeit für Zensur sind nicht nur eine theoretische Möglichkeit, sondern
wurden durch eine Reihe von Vorfällen zur praktisch durchführbaren Realität. Aus
diesen Gründen wäre es wünschenswert, alternative Microblogging-Dienste zur Ver-
fügung zu haben, die ein Mehr an Privatheit bieten und zugleich resilienter gegenüber
Zensurmaßnahmen sind. In dieser Arbeit wird ein verteiltes, peer-to-peer basiertes
Microblogging-System vorgestellt, welches aus mobilen Smartphone-Nutzern besteht,
die ihre Nachrichten unter einem Gruppenschlüssel verschlüsselt anonym und zensur-
geschützt verbreiten können. Die Nutzer benutzen für das Verbreiten der Nachrich-
ten Peer-Synchronisationen, d.h. es erfolgt  wann immer sich aufgrund der örtlichen
Nähe zweier Nutzer die Möglichkeit ergibt einen direkten Kommunikationskanal zwi-
schen den Smartphones aufzubauen  ein beidseitiger Austausch von vorbereiteten
Nachrichtenpuﬀern. Die Art auf die die Nachrichtenpuﬀer gefüllt werden hängt da-
bei von einer gewählten Synchronisationsstrategie ab. Um die Durchführbarkeit des
vorgeschlagenen Microblogging-Systems vorzuführen, wird die Nachrichtenverbrei-
tung mittels Simulationen experimentell untersucht, die auf Grundlage eines breiten
Spektrums von synthetischen und empirischen Bewegungsmustern der Nutzer erfol-
gen. Es wird gezeigt, unter welchen Bedingungen hinsichtlich Bewegungsmuster und
Netzwerkeinstellungen die Nachrichtenverbreitung gelingt, inklusive der Auswirkun-
gen von verschiedenen Synchronisationsstrategien. Neben dem ungehinderten Ablauf
wird dabei auch der Betrieb unter dem Vorhandensein von Gegenspielern getestet,
die das Netzwerk durch Jamming oder das Versenden von Spam unbrauchbar machen
wollen. Da die Nachrichtenverbreitung in einem reinen peer-to-peer basierten System
von der Bewegung der Nutzer und den daraus resultierenden Begegnungen derselben
abhängig ist, kann es vorkommen, dass die durch Peer-Synchronisationen erreichte
Nachrichtenverbreitung langsam erfolgt oder sogar nicht stattﬁnden kann, falls Teile
des Netzwerks segmentiert und somit voneinander abgeschottet sind. In diesen Fällen
ist es vorgesehen einen höheren Verbreitungsgrad der Nachrichten durch die Benut-
zung einer Server-Komponente zu erreichen, die die Nachrichten der verschiedenen
Gruppen in einer Oblivious RAM (ORAM) Datenstruktur speichert. Dieser Spei-
cher erlaubt es den Nutzern lesend oder schreibend auf ihre Nachrichten zuzugreifen,
ohne dass der Server aus diesen Zugriﬀen irgendwelche Informationen über die Art
des Zugriﬀs oder auf die zugegriﬀenen Nachrichten gewinnen kann. Das vorgestellte
Microblogging-System ist nutzbar, jedoch ist die Nachrichtenverbreitung aufgrund
der für die Anonymität nötigen Designentscheidungen verzögert.
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Chapter1
Introduction
In this introduction at ﬁrst a summary of the variety of Online Social Networking
sites is given in Section 1.1. Then a short introduction of microblogging is presented
and the need for privacy-enhanced microblogging is motivated. This is followed by
an outlook of the remainder of the thesis in Section 1.2 and an overview of the
publications that were made during the course of this dissertation in Section 1.3.
1.1 Online Social Networking
After the Internet's widespread growth in the 1990's, a new form of communication
platforms emerged in the 2000's, the social networking sites (SNSs) or online social
networks (OSNs). The sites that oﬀer OSN services can range from weblogs, i.e., web
sites that chronologically display postings of mostly persons but also of organizations,
to social networks, i.e., web sites that allow registered members with a personal
proﬁle page to connect with other members of the social network and exchange
messages. Geolocation services allow people with a mobile device, e.g., a smartphone,
to broadcast their current location to their list of contacts, thus allowing people to
meet based on the notices received from the geolocation service.
1.1.1 Microblogging as Online Social Networking Service
Microblogging is a popular form of Online Social Networking activity. It is part of
an area of OSN known as micromedia, where small snippets of media, e.g., text,
images, or video, are shared amongst users. Users usually can subscribe to the
message channels of other users or create message channels themselves. Twitter1 is
the most prominent service used extensively for microblogging, with over 300 million
monthly active users2. The name Twitter is derived from the verb to tweet and there
1https://twitter.com
2https://about.twitter.com/company
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exists a terminology of its own for the user actions and users, with for example the
following terms:
• Tweeter: the user who sends a short message of around 140 characters.
• To tweet: the user action of sending a message.
• Tweet: a microblogging message.
• To re-tweet: the resending of a tweet of a user under its own name.
• Follower: a user that subscribes to all tweets sent by a tweeter.
• Hashtag: the sign # is used to indicate search terms and categorizes tweets.
1.1.2 Privacy and Censorship Issues in Microblogging Services
Microblogging services allow users to send out clear, succinct and informative mes-
sages of around 140 characters to their subscribers.
The communication in the oﬀered services is typically in plaintext and public;
furthermore, all widely adopted services (such as Twitter) follow the client-server
model. The interaction with Twitter is usually done via a web interface or an app
for smartphones, so that the sender (tweeter) logs in either using the Internet directly
or by indirectly connecting to it via the mobile telephony network. The sender can
then post (tweet) messages on his named user channel as he seems ﬁt. In order to tag
a message with a speciﬁc topic the hashtag-character can be placed directly before a
term. Subscribers (followers) can receive all the messages (tweets) from the sender,
if they have subscribed to a certain user channel. The sum of all channels of wich
a user is a follower are the user's subscriptions. Also, users can forward messages
under their own name (re-tweet). Finally, users can search for messages using the
hashtags assigned to the messages as query terms. Even if transport encryption is
used, all user behavior is transparent on the server-side.
Unfortunately, these design decisions create numerous privacy and security prob-
lems, particularly in more oppressive political surroundings.3 For example, Privacy
International, a privacy rights group, has obtained evidence that intelligence agen-
cies of the United Kingdom are collecting social media information on millions of
individuals with mass surveillance programs. Large searchable databases contain
bulk personal datasets (BPDs) per individual which can include details such as
an individual's religion, racial or ethnic origin, political views, medical condition,
sexual orientation, and legally privileged, journalistic or `otherwise conﬁdential' in-
formation. These BPDs vary in size from hundreds to millions of records, and
3Cf. reports of reporters without borders, https://rsf.org.
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are acquired by overt and covert channels.4 Another example is a program named
PRISM which allows United States intelligence agencies to directly tap into central
servers of leading Internet companies, with access to text, audio and video chats,
e-mails, documents and connection logs.5
Since most of the existing microblogging services do not hide the message content
from the service operator, conﬁdentiality is not addressed.6 Thus, all content gener-
ated by the users can be analyzed by the service providers. In addition, the complete
user activity is transparent to the providers, such as messages sent and received by
users or each user's group subscriptions. Moreover, all user interactions are known
to the central provider, among them all messages sent, all existing subscriptions, the
entire query-patterns of users, etc. Complete data retention facilitates traﬃc anal-
ysis as well as data mining on the unencrypted messages. Incidents indicate that
such data retention is routinely done in practice. For example, a program named
Tempora allows British intelligence agencies to set up a large-scale database that
buﬀers and stores internet communication for 3 days and metadata that describes
basic information on who has been contacting whom for 30 days. The key source
for obtaining the data are intercept probes attached to transatlantic ﬁbre-optic ca-
bles, essentially capturing the traﬃc ﬂowing between the Internet exchange points
of Western Europe and North America.7
Current microblogging services are also prone to censorship. All messages are
relayed over central servers and messages can be censored based on their content
and sender or receiver, thus prohibiting the spread of content according to censorship
policies. Due to the centralized nature of the services and the messages in plain text,
acts of censorship can easily be performed either by the service providers themselves
or by external parties. Furthermore, centralized systems are vulnerable to local
Internet disruptions and outages, either unintentionally, e.g., power grid failures, or
intentionally, e.g., blocking speciﬁc services or Internet shut-downs via `kill-switches'.
The intentional censorship that takes place can on the one hand only target a limited
number of OSN services or speciﬁc Internet sites and studies show that a multitude
of services and websites such as Twitter, YouTube, Wikipedia or Google have been
blocked in parts of the world. [119] On the other hand, complete Internet shut-downs
have also been reported on numerous occasions.
4Cf. https://techcrunch.com/2017/10/17/uk-spies-using-social-media-data-for-mass-
surveillance/.
5Cf. https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-
from-nine-us-internet-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-
cebf-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_story.html.
6Of course it can be conceded that fast message broadcasting and not conﬁdentiality was the
design goal and therefore the comparison might not be adequate.
7Cf. https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jun/21/gchq-cables-secret-world-
communications-nsa.
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An earlier example of such an Internet shut-down took place in Burma in 2007,
when a sharp increase in fuel prices sparked protests in the population. Using cell
phones and the Internet a small group of Burmese protesters circulated information
amongst themselves. Also, they created awareness outside of Burma by photographs
and videos sent over the Internet. In response, the Burmese military made use of
its full control over the country's Internet gateways and shut down the Internet ac-
cess completely in order to stop these information ﬂows. Additionally, the cellular
telephony infrastructure was reportedly disrupted.8 Another example can be found
in the wake of protests and riots in numerous North African and Middle Eastern
countries that started in late 2010. Denial of Internet access was a strategy used
by authorities to prohibit demonstrations and to prevent information to be dissem-
inated via the Internet. Egypt and Libya experienced full Internet shut-downs in
attempts of the governement to quell protests [33]. The most aggressive form that
was also used in Egypt consisted of the removal of the countries Border Gateway
Protocol (BGP) entries. BGP exchanges information on active IP address ranges
between the Internet service providers all over the world, thus facilitating connec-
tions between the multiple autonomous networks worldwide. However, the deletion
of the 3,500 Egyptian preﬁxes meant that this routing information was missing from
the routing tables of BGP routers around the world. Consequently, routers could
no longer send packets to an IP address that fell within these Egyptian preﬁxes.
The authorities had issued the order to disconnect from the BGP to the countries
four Internet service providers, and they complied with the order, thus eﬀectively
removing the country from the Internet.9
In both cases  unintentional Internet outages due to power grid failures and inten-
tional Internet shut-downs  most current microblogging systems cease to function.
1.1.3 Need for Privacy-enhanced Microblogging
These aforementioned problems call for alternative microblogging architectures that
are privacy-friendly. In this thesis, a private mobile microblogging architecture is
proposed that respects the users' privacy and is resilient to censorship. In this
thesis the focus is laid on microblogging of text messages. In particular, we rely on
the fact that smartphones are becoming ubiquitous communication devices, which
are equipped with local communication links (such as NFC links and ad-hoc Wiﬁ
networks), while having Internet connectivity. The smartphones can thus be a part
of a mobile system such as a Vehicular Ad-hoc Network (VANET). Instead of relying
on a centralized infrastructure to exchange messages, the proposed solution is based
on a Peer-to-Peer (P2P) architecture, involving mobile peers that exchange messages
8Cf. https://opennet.net/research/bulletins/013.
9Cf. http://techland.time.com/2011/01/28/how-egypt-cut-off-the-internet/.
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with each other using local radio links and a message synchronization strategy, an
action named peer-sync which does not rely on any form of Internet or wide area
network access. This peer synchronization essentially allows peers to microblog short
messages privately using their smartphones while on-the-go. Optionally, users can
also upload messages to a server or download messages from a server by an action
called server-sync. These server synchronizations are optional and can be enabled
or disabled by the users. Messages are transmitted in encrypted form so that only
a group of authorized peers can access it; messages that cannot be read by one
peer will nevertheless be forwarded in a re-randomized fashion in order to guarantee
appropriate message distribution, while at the same time providing unlinkability,
i.e., an adversary cannot identiﬁy if messages are related or not, against passive
adversaries that do not actively participate in the network and only observe network
traﬃc.
Moreover, the proposed architecture oﬀers censorship-resistance: The distributed
data storage at all peers contains multiple replications of messages and is thus dif-
ﬁcult to censor. The decentralized message dissemination over point-to-point links
conducted by dynamically moving peers is hard to shut down in its totality, thereby
increasing the availability. The use of randomizable encryption allows to gain unlink-
ability of messages as well as sender anonymity, i.e., an adversary cannot suﬃciently
identify the sender within the set of the users. Finally, the use of (group) encryption
limits the number of parties who can access messages.
1.2 Outlook
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 surveys related work,
ranging from early anonymity systems to solutions focusing on privacy-enhanced
microblogging. At ﬁrst the chapter looks at the main anonymity systems, namely
mixes, mix networks, onion routing and The Onion Router (TOR) as well as crowds.
An overview of anonymity in mobile networks is then given, followed by a more
detailed look on solutions providing anonymity for microblogging in diﬀerent network
settings, including a look on some privacy-friendly instant messaging apps.
Chapter 3 details the envisioned privacy-enhanced microblogging solution. The
chapter ﬁrstly introduces the required anonymity terminology and states diﬀerent
adversary capabilities, before the desired privacy and security goals of the privacy-
enhanced microblogging solution and the assumed adversary model are described.
Then, the architecture of the privacy-enhanced microblogging solution with its core
components is introduced, including the infrastructure, the message format and mes-
sage storage, the used encryption scheme, group and key management, and the
synchronization of messages using the two mechanisms of peer-syncs and server-
syncs. An analysis of the extent to which the stated goals of privacy, anonymity
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and censorship-resistance can be met is then made, followed by some remarks on the
limitations of building an anonymity system in general. Finally, the chapter includes
a short outlook on a built proof-of-concept demonstrator which shows how an actual
implementation of the microblogging solution can look like.
Chapter 4 shows the feasibility of the proposed microblogging system using a sim-
ulation running with peer-syncs only, i.e., no Internet or wide area network access. It
explores and tests the boundaries in which the microblogging system works. To that
end, diﬀerent empirical mobility datasets and a wide range of synthetically generated
mobility datasets are created. The setup of the simulations to which the datasets
serve as input is then described and explained, before the simulation results for
the runs without adversary interference are presented and analysed. Subsequently,
adversary-tampered simulation runs and their eﬀects with respect to anonymity and
censorship-resistance are examined, before a short discussion on the limitations of
the proposed microblogging system is given.
Chapter 5 looks at an extension of the peer-sync process using private set intersec-
tion protocols. The chapter ﬁrst reviews existing classes of private set intersection
protocols and then details one promising protocol that is well suited for the given
application scenario. The chapter then describes simulations of the peer-syncs using
private set intersection and analyses the obtained results.
In Chapter 6 an oblivious random access memory (ORAM) extension for the server-
syncs is introduced. We require this extension, because in cases of network segmen-
tation in the peer-to-peer network a server enables to distribute messages accross
segments. The server is for privacy reasons required to not be able to deduce any
group memberships of the users. For this purpose, an ORAM that does not demand
expensive computations from the client is chosen and adapted to the given applica-
tion scenario. With the found solution the clients do only need to be online when
they want to access the server, and the privacy of the clients access patterns against
the server is guaranteed at all times.
Chapter 7 concludes this thesis.
1.3 Publications
This dissertation is based on the following publications:
• Microblogging in a Privacy-Preserving way with Nikolaos P. Karvelas and Ste-
fan Katzenbeisser, in 12th International Workshop on Frontiers in Availability,
Reliability and Security (FARES 2017), August 29September 1, 2017, Reggio
Calabria, Italy. [68]
• On the Privacy and Performance of Mobile Anonymous Microblogging with
Ana Barroso, Mihai Bucicoiu, Matthias Hollick, Stefan Katzenbeisser and
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Erik Tews. In: IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security,
11(7):15781591, 2016. [112]
• MoP-2-MoP  Mobile private microblogging with Mihai Bucicoiu, Erik Tews,
Frederik Armknecht, Stefan Katzenbeisser and Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi. In: 18th
International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security (FC
2014), March 3-7, 2014, Christ Church, Barbados. [113]
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Chapter2
Related Work
Related work is ﬁrst outlined in Section 2.1 on anonymity systems in general, then a
review on anonymity in mobile networks is given in Section 2.2, before related work
on privacy and anonymity in microblogging systems is investigated in Section 2.3.
Finally, a conclusion on the studied related work is given in Section 2.4.
2.1 Anonymity Systems
For web traﬃc some common anonymity systems include mixes, onion routing with
Tor, and crowds, concepts which we subsequently describe.
2.1.1 Mixes and Mix Networks
One of the ﬁrst ideas for the construction of an anonymity system is that of a
mix proposed by Chaum [22]. A mix has an asymmetric key pair of which the
public key is known to senders. Senders encrypt their message alongside with some
randomness and the identity of the recipient of their message under the public key of
the mix. The mix stripes oﬀ the encryption using its corresponding private key and
waits until a threshold amount of messages has arrived. The mix then sends all the
accumulated messages out to their recipients in a diﬀerent order than they arrived
at the mix. This kind of mix is called a threshold mix and the ﬂushing, i.e., the
re-sending of messages, is done once a ﬁxed amount of messages has arrived at the
mix. Other ﬂushing strategies of a mix can be the re-sending of all messages that
arrived in a speciﬁed time span, i.e., a timed mix as proposed in [114], or a stop-
and-go-mix [70], i.e., mixes which delay messages by a user-speciﬁed time that is
appended to the packet before encrypting it with the mixes public key. The diﬀerent
ﬂushing strategies have all been devised with the aim to achieve unlinkability in the
face of a global passive adversary, who should not be able to link the incoming and
outcoming messages of the mix.
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Mix networks extend the idea of one mix to a chain of mixes. Messages are relayed
over multiple mixes that pool the messages and send them over to the next mix until
they reach their receivers. Each mix has an asymmetric cipher key pair of which the
public key is known to the senders. A user can either conﬁgure a route of mixes over
which to relay his messages himself, or he can make use of pre-conﬁgured routes to
generate a mix cascade. The message must be encrypted in multiple layers, so that
the innermost encryption is done using the public key of the last mix of the route and
the outermost encryption is done using the public key of the ﬁrst mix of the route.
The encryption of the message of the intermediate mixes are done accordingly. Each
mix removes the outermost encryption layer, then the messages are sorted into a
new permutation and send along to the next mix in the route according to a given
ﬂushing strategy as described above.
2.1.2 Onion Routing and Tor
Onion routing [55] is a circuit-oriented adaption of the layered encryption of mix
networks whose goal it is to avoid high latencies caused by the pooling of messages in
mixes before they are ﬂushed. The aim of getting closer to real-time traﬃc is obtained
by omitting the mixing, i.e., the pooling of messages and ﬂushing according to a given
strategy. Users select a circuit of relay nodes, i.e., entry node, intermediary nodes and
exit node, over which the layer-wise encrypted packages are routed, and each node
only knows its predecessor and successor. All traﬃc is directly forwarded over these
circuits, thus minimizing delays. Onion routing is the basis of Tor [39], the reference
implementation of the onion routing concept. The Tor project1 is tailored for web
traﬃc and allows to route TCP streams over a circuit of relay nodes. Tor's basic
approach does not guarantee anonymity even against a global passive adversary, and
a number of attacks on the Tor network have been investigated [7, 51, 88]. Yet, Tor
with its easy to use client and interface is a popular and widespread used anonymity
tool [27], which is actively maintained and improved [24, 61, 93].
2.1.3 Crowds
An early peer-to-peer approach for anonymity in web transactions is Crowds [104,
105]. Peers probabilistically create a static path over which web transactions are
relayed.
The crowd is a dynamically formed user base. To connect to other users and
become part of the crowd, a user has to connect to a contact server which has to admit
the user's request to join the crowd. Once a user joined the crowd, the contact server
sends the needed key material to the newly added user, since transport encryption
1https://www.torproject.org
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established between each pair of users is required by the crowd mechanism. The
server reports to the joining user also the current user base of the crowd so that he
can connect to other users. Each user of the crowd thus has to be a member of the
crowd. When the user wants to start a web session, a route involving multiple other
users is probabilistically created as follows: Randomly, the user picks another user
of the crowd and forwards his encrypted request to it. The receiving user forwards
the request newly encrypted to another randomly chosen user with probability 1 >
pforward > 0.5, otherwise with probability 1−pforward the request is forwarded to the
destination server. Once a path is established further messages from the initiating
user are relayed over the same route to the server, and the server's responses are
relayed over the same route to the initiating user. With this construction a sender
anonymity of beyond suspicion is achieved, i.e., even though the adversary is aware
that a message has been sent, the sender is from the perspective of the adversary
no more likely to be the originator of that sent message than any other user in the
system, since every user relays requests to a randomly chosen other user of the crowd;
thus for each user the probability of being the original sender is the same.
2.2 Anonymity and Routing in Mobile Networks
Solutions that address anonymity in mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), where rout-
ing between mobile devices is done in a self-conﬁgured manner, include ALARM [37]
and MASK [137]. ALARM is a secure link-state based routing protocol which
achieves anonymity and untraceability of the participating nodes, as well as other
security properties such as data integrity by leveraging group signatures. In or-
der to operate, the nodes' current locations are securely disseminated to construct
topology snapshots and to forward data. However, each node needs to periodically
broadcast its location to all other nodes by ﬂooding, making scalability an issue for
larger MANETs containing thousands of nodes. MASK is an anonymous on-demand
routing protocol, which achieves anonymous MAC-layer and network-layer commu-
nications. It is based on the use of dynamic pseudonyms instead of static MAC and
network addresses. The protocol achieves sender and receiver anonymity. Node un-
locatability is also an included goal, meaning that although adversaries might know
some real network addresses, they are unable to decide where the corresponding
nodes are in the network. In the context of vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs),
where revocable anonymity is needed for liability issues, pseudonymity schemes are
typically used to provide anonymity during normal operation [44].
In delay-tolerant networks (DTNs), which maintain no explicit routing informa-
tion, human mobility and its characteristics (cf. [106]) are leveraged for message
propagation. Su et al. [125] argue, based on collected human mobility data, that
eﬀective routing decisions can be made by only knowing the pair-wise contacts that
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took place between nodes, irrespective of mobility models or location information.
Speciﬁcally, they claim that human mobility traces allow devices to beneﬁcently route
packets leveraging short-range radio to extend the range of existing infrastructure
or to provide a means to communicate in places where there is no existing infras-
tructure. Chaintreau et al. [20] empirically demonstrate, that the distribution of the
intercontact time2 between wireless devices carried by humans can be approximated
by a power law distribution for durations ranging from 10 minutes up to a day. One
of their ﬁndings was the discovery of a new class of message forwarding algorithms
named oblivious forwarding algorithms, which are in contrast to other ﬁndings
well approximated by a power-law distribution. In Humanets [4], smartphone-to-
smartphone communication is used to more eﬃciently propagate messages, while at
the same time avoiding the use of mobile telephony networks. In the approach used
in this thesis, these observations are leveraged both in the microblogging system and
in its simulation. A number of solutions for content distribution in DTNs have been
proposed (cf. [84], [87], [86]). However, propositions focusing on anonymity in such
scenarios are scarce: Rogers et al. [108] focus on secure communication over diverse
networks achieving conﬁdentiality, authenticity, integrity and forward security, but
do not speciﬁcally address anonymity. The property of forward secrecy is gained
by using secrets initially shared between all endpoint pairs of devices, from which a
one-way key derivation function creates short-lived temporary secrets. In contrast to
these approaches, the microblogging system used in this thesis targets strong privacy
and anonymity properties.
2.3 Anonymity for Microblogging
In this section related work with respect to microblogging is discussed. Firstly, this
is done in Section 2.3.1 for client-server solutions that by design are prone to system
outages and censorship. Then, in Section 2.3.2 solutions that deploy techniques from
peer-to-peer technologies in a wide are networking setting similar to the Internet
are discussed, followed by solutions tailored towards a delay-tolerant networking
setting in Section 2.3.3. To complete the related work section a brief look on instant
messaging applications for smartphones is done in Section 2.3.4.
2.3.1 Client-Server Solutions
Privacy-enhanced client-server microblogging similar to Twitter is proposed in [30],
describing a microblogging server that matches encrypted messages to subscribers us-
ing oblivious matching, resulting in a Twitter-like service with two particular privacy
2Chaintreau et al. deﬁne this term as the time gap separating two contacts between the same pair
of devices.
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goals for tweeters and followers: ﬁrst, a tweeter encrypts all his tweets and is able to
choose who is allowed to access them via deﬁning an access-control list based on the
tweets' content, i.e., their hashtags. This enables low-level content based authoriza-
tion of followers. Second, followers can subscribe to arbitrary hashtags and by doing
so do not leak any information thereof to any other entitiy, resulting in privacy for
followers. In order to guarantee these privacy goals, the system relies on a trusted
third party called Hummingbird server, to which all users register in order to get
their personal RSA key pair. By the use of an Oblivious Pseudo Random Function-
protocol [46], the privacy of followers is ensured when issuing a follow request for
another tweeter, i.e., the content of the following-by-topic hashtags are hidden from
the Hummingbird server. The matching of tweets to followers is eﬀectuated by the
Hummingbird server using oblivious matching. Thus tweets are matched to followers
while learning nothing about the cleartext tweets and hashtags. The adversary is as-
sumed to be honest-but-curious, i.e., it does not deviate from the speciﬁed protocols.
Yet, anonymity and censorship-resistance are no design goals.
The Twitsper server [118] is, similar to the Hummingbird server, added to the
existing Twitter architecture. Twitsper extends Twitter's API with three functions:
privately send a tweet to all users in a speciﬁed group; determining whether a tweet is
private; and the option to privately reply to all the tweeter's followers who received an
original tweet. The Twitsper server integrates into Twitter and acts as the facilitator
of communication amongst private groups, thus enabling the private sending of tweets
only by handling the associated metadata (the tweets are still handled by Twitter's
servers). The privacy gains are limited compared to those of the Hummingbird
Server: users who are not member of a private communication should not be able
to infer which users are involved in the private communication, and the Twitsper
server itself should also not be able to infer any member of private communications.
In addition, the server should also not know the size of a private group. Anonymity
and censorship-resistance are again no design goals.
To achieve anonymity in these scenarios, the use of Tor or a subscription service
with unlinkability of users across logins such as [75, 76] is needed.
A diﬀerent approach is followed in h00t [5]. Their idea is to take the existing Twit-
ter infrastructure with its numerous Tweets as cover traﬃc and to overload Twitter's
hashtag mechanism to create censorship-resistant microblogging. h00t provides an
interface that is much like Twitter, except that the original plaintext hashtags are
replaced with short hashes of them, followed by the encrypted message. Simpliﬁed,
every Tweet consists of the AES-encrypted message text prepended by the only 24
bit long hash of the original plaintext hashtag. In this way, the short hashtags from
diﬀerent original plaintext hashtags are meant to collide. Each user interested in a
speciﬁc hashtag has to download all the messages that have the same short hashtag
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as the actual original plaintext hashtag he is interested in. The authors claim that
this achieves a form of censorship-resistance, since only a so-called heavy-handed
censorship can be applied by the adversary: a speciﬁc original plaintext hashtag
can only be censored through its short hash, creating the necessity to censor all the
other original plaintext hashtags that have the same colliding short hashtag, i.e., no
ﬁne-grained censorship is possible. The recipients in this way also obtain a form of
receiver anonymity, since they have to download a larger amount of messages than
the ones they are actually interested in. These additional messages serve as cover
traﬃc and the h00t client software has to decrypt and ﬁlter out all the superﬂuous
messages downloaded. However, the possibility of censorship, in particular heavy-
handed censorship, based on the deployed client-server infrastructure used by Twitter
still persists.
Twitterize [36] also relies on the pre-existing client-server architecture of Twitter.
Twitterize's goal is to provide conﬁdentiality and anonymity to the users. To achieve
conﬁdentiality all tweets are encrypted. For anonymity overlay networks are created
for each hashtag, which consist of subsets of all the Twitter users that make up the
network. All overlays contain additional users referred to as forwarders which are
not interested in tweets of the given hashtag. Their function is not to send or receive
tweets for this given hashtag, but to increase the size of the anonymity set. The
overlay networks connect senders and receivers without the requirement to directly
communicate with each other. The system is built in such a way that senders and
receivers are decoupled and that a singular forwarder is unable to link senders and
receivers. As a kind of mix network this is a privacy-preserving peer-to-peer overlay
constructed on top of the existing infrastructure of Twitter.
2.3.2 Peer-to-Peer Solutions in a Wide Area Network Setting
Some wide area network dependent peer-to-peer microblogging systems exist, but
they rarely focus on anonymity and censorship-resistance.
One ﬁrst decentralized microblogging solutions based on the peer-to-peer paradigm
is Litter [65, 67]. Litter assumes the presence of a peer-to-peer middleware that en-
ables direct communication amongst peers. In particular, they use SocialVPN [66], a
peer-to-peer virtual private network which uses social networks in order to establish
encrypted IP tunnels between befriended peers. On top of these encrypted links
they build a decentralized microblogging approach with best-eﬀort UDP multicast
packet delivery, i.e., one that does not use acknowledgments or timeouts for message
retransmissions. They propose a push/pull mechanism for propagating messages,
a message format, and a message revocation mechanism. The solution thus oﬀers
the beneﬁts of decentralization in a peer-to-peer solution with best-eﬀort propaga-
tion. The security guarantees are however limited to link encryption between peers
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based on public-key cryptography in conjunction with a public key infrastructure.
Anonymity and censorship-resistance were no design goals.
Megaphone [94] is another solution that targets fault-tolerance and scalability
through decentralization. They also argue that the current web-based client-server
services for microblogging introduce a single point of failure. The peer-to-peer tech-
nology used by Megaphone is Pastry [109], a peer-to-peer middleware that organizes
a network through nodeIds which are based on a hash of unique characteristics of a
nodes device, such as MAC address or IP address, on top of which Scribe [19] is used,
a scalable application-level multicast infrastructure that supports large numbers of
groups, also with large number of members per group. Megaphone itself makes use
of a public-key infrastructure so that messages can be signed and encrypted, and the
Pastry's nodeIds are used together with Scribe to distribute the messages per group
in the peer-to-peer network.
In [43] a cryptographic mechanism is presented, which allows a peer to anony-
mously request messages from other peers in a peer-to-peer network. In this network
setup peers are only connected to personally trusted peers, and a peer forwards his
message directly to its trusted peers. If a peer missed a message, a use of hierarchical
identity based encryption takes place, so that this peer can pull the missed messages
from the other trusted peers while maintaining anonymity of the peers involved.
Yet, all approaches need Internet access, in contrast to the scenario pursued in
this thesis, and the security guarantees exclusively either focus on anonymity or
censorship-resistance, but not on both.
2.3.3 Delay-Tolerant Networking Solutions
Few microblogging systems in delay-tolerant networks, as used in the proposed sys-
tem, exist. In the area of ubiquitous computing a system named ﬂoating content [91]
foresees an ephemeral content sharing service, built and wholly dependent on the mo-
bility of users with their mobile devices. Any given user is able to create content,
which is only created locally, tagging it with its geographic origin alongside with a
validity radius and an expiration time. These three items deﬁne the anchor zone
in which the content is disseminated and for how long it should be disseminated.
Dissemination of the content is ﬁrst achieved by the creator's device to its neighbors
within the validity radius, and then the dissemination is organised by the other nodes
within the anchor zone, given that there are enough participating mobile devices in
the anchor zone. If this is the case, the content ﬂoats in that ﬁxed zone, and if too
few nodes are in the zone, the content vanishes. In total, this geographically limited
content dissemination is simulated so as to see the possible lifetimes of the content,
and criticality conditions have been derived [126] for this ubiquitous computing use
case.
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In a network setting similar to ours, Robin [8] proposes a microblogging system that
uses community reputation to prevent ﬂooding of the network with junk messages. A
ﬂooding attack is done by malicious users that create junk messages on behalf of other
users and of Sybil users with fake identities. Their goal is a Denial-of-Service attack
by propagating their junk messages to as many other nodes as possible. A technique
called diversity selection treats the problem of selecting the reliable messages out
of a pool of messages which contains far fewer reliable messages from real users
than junk messages created by malicious users. However, sender anonymity is not
a goal since each message is associated with the public key of the creator. Also,
nodes need to choose a number of trusted nodes from the social graph called entry
points. The possible ﬂows of messages in the social graph from the creator to the
entry points are then investigated, and it is claimed that a high number of junk
messages is routed along the attack edges from malicious users. Flow control is then
enforced to limit that number of junk messages. The idea of Robin is continued
in the work of Rangzen [77], which proposes a mobile microblogging solution with
trusted message propagation by the use of social graphs and additionally private-set
intersection protocols to prioritize messages.
Yet, the foci of these works are not on anonymity and censorship-resistance, and
no other solutions in this niche are known to the author.
2.3.4 Private Instant Messaging Apps
This section brieﬂy deals with instant messaging apps for smartphones, since they
are to some extent related to microblogging. Their main diﬀerence is, that they
mainly focus on one-to-one communication, but they do also oﬀer one-to-many com-
munication. Messages get delivered instantly, just as in texting, which has since the
advent of widespread mobile telephony in the mid to late nineties been a popular
form of communication. To achieve real-time communication, the messaging app
clients are constantly in contact with a server. There are only instant messaging
apps that work with the client-server paradigm and no peer-to-peer solutions. One
of the most popular apps is called WhatsApp3, and even though after initial criticism
end-to-end encryption has been introduced, the app does not have all the features
needed to be labeled privacy-friendly. This is because the provider still has access
to the encryption keys used and can thus break the conﬁdentiality of the messages
exchanged between users. Another issue is that there is no mechanism that allows
users to verify their correspondents identity4.
But there are other instant messaging apps for smartphones that are more focused
on security and privacy aspects.
3https://www.whatsapp.com/
4Cf. https://www.eff.org/secure-messaging-scorecard
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TextSecure5 is one app that uses AES encryption and the keys used to encrypt the
messages are stored exclusively on the users device. Also a passphrase can be used to
encrypt the entire local message database and the secret keys used to communicate
privately with the other users. Each user gets assigned a unique ﬁngerprint which
can be communicated over the phone by voice, but a veriﬁcation is also possible upon
personal encounter of two users by generating a barcode of the user ﬁngergrint that
is displayed on the device and scanned with the other users smartphone. The apps
source code is freely available.
Threema6 is another app with end-to-end encryption. Users receive a random
user id which is not linked to their email address or phone number, thus allowing
to use the app with a certain degree of anonymity. Asymmetric ECC key pairs are
generated by and used with the open source cryptography library NaCl7 to encrypt
and decrypt the messages. To veriﬁably obtain another user's public key a user can
scan its QR code when they personally encounter each other. The contact lists are
managed on-device only and the messages are deleted from the servers immediately
once they have been delivered.
2.4 Conclusion
This chapter outlined the main anonymity systems designed for the Internet, e.g.,
mixes, mix networks, and crowds. The two approaches of mix networks and crowds
(peer-to-peer) have been discussed extensively [14], and ultimately the layered en-
cryption of mix networks has been further developed to onion routing. The Tor
anonymity network runs based on onion routing and is currently the most widespread
system used for anonymity on the Internet.
The focus was then shifted to microblogging solutions with additional security and
privacy features in diﬀerent network settings: client-server, peer-to-peer with wide
area networking, and delay tolerant networking. The review of this related work
showed that the security and privacy guarantees of previous constructions solely
focused either on anonymity or on censorship-resistance, but not on both at the
same time.
5http://whispersystems.org/
6https://threema.ch/en
7http://nacl.cr.yp.to/
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Chapter3
Microblogging Solution
In this chapter needed anonymity terminology and adversary capabilities are intro-
duced in Section 3.1, alongside with a deﬁnition of the solution's privacy and security
goals  namely (sender) anonymity, privacy, and censorship-resistance  and an out-
line of the assumed adversarial capabilities. A description of the new microblogging
solution is given in Section 3.2. This is followed in Section 3.3 by a discussion on
how the desired privacy and security goals can be met by the proposed solution.
Section 3.4 contains remarks on the diﬃculties of building an anonymity system in
general. Finally, in Section 3.5 a built demonstrator of the microblogging solution is
described.
3.1 Prerequisites
This section will ﬁrst introduce some needed terminology surrounding anonymity,
and then elaborate on adversary capabilities. The related notion of privacy deals with
making a boundary between what information belonging to an individual belongs to
the public domain and what information belongs to the private domain. If privacy is
seen as the right to be left alone [129], then anonymity deals with the right to leave
one's identity undisclosed.
This section ﬁrst introduces the needed nomenclature for privacy and anonymity
in Section 3.1.1, illustrates diﬀerent capabilities of adversaries in general in Sec-
tion 3.1.2, states this solution's design goals of anonymity, privacy and censorship-
resistance in Section 3.1.3, and lastly outlines the adversary model assumed in this
thesis in Section 3.1.4.
3.1.1 Anonymity Terminology
A step towards a standardization of the vocabulary in the ﬁeld of anonymity research
is the anonymity terminology initially proposed by Pﬁtzmann and Köhntopp [95, 96],
from which some of our terminology is taken:
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• Anonymity : anonymity of a subject from an adversary's perspective means that
the adversary cannot suﬃciently identify the subject within a set of subjects,
the anonymity set.
• Sender anonymity : a sender is from an adversary's perspective anonymous
within a set of potential sender, his/her sender anonymity set, which itself
may be a subset of all subjects in the anonymity set who may send a message
from time to time.
• Unlinkability : an adversary cannot suﬃciently identify if items of interest, i.e.,
subjects, messages, or actions, are related or not. If linkability, the opposite of
unlinkability, is given, the adversary can get insights on the connection between
certain messages, their respective senders and receivers. Unlinkability is thus
stronger than anonymity, since it comprises anonymity.
• Undetectability : an adversary cannot suﬃciently distinguish whether an item
of interest, i.e., subjects, messages, or actions, exists or not.
• Unobservability : undetectability of the item of interest, i.e., subjects, messages,
or actions, against all subjects uninvolved in it and anonymity of the subject(s)
involved in the item of interest, even against the other subject(s) involved in
that item of interest.
3.1.2 Adversary Capabilities
The above-mentioned anonymity terminology shows that anonymity is achieved if
an adversary can neither identify the sender nor the recipient of a message, i.e., the
adversary can not determine who is sending to whom what speciﬁc message. These
properties are named sender anonymity and receiver anonymity.
The capabilities of adversaries are, generally speaking, limited by the extent to
which they can use the three resources people, time and both hardware and software
equipment. However, a characterization of adversary capabilities with respect to the
following distinctions is usually made [103, 133]:
• Participation: the adversary can be internal and be a part of the network, or
not be a part of the network and be external.
• Capability : the adversary may either be passive and thus able to monitor and
record traﬃc or active, thus being able to inject, drop and modify traﬃc, but
unable to break cryptographic primitives such as encryption schemes (a so
called Dolev-Yao-Attacker).
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• Mobility : a static adversary can only monitor the same subset of the network,
whereas a dynamic adversary chooses a subset of the network based on the
information obtained from it.
• Visibility : a global adversary is able to access all network traﬃc, in contrast to
a local adversary, who has only access to a subset of the network.
3.1.3 Privacy and Security Goals
Anonymity, privacy, censorship-resistance are the desired goals of the mobile private
microblogging solution presented in this thesis:
Anonymity Sender anonymity is pursued; that is, an adversary should have no in-
formation on the originator of a message. This can also be achieved if message
unlinkability is given, since it comprises sender and receiver anonymity. In our
solution the desired property of anonymity is achieved by fulﬁlling the stronger
property of unlinkability.
Privacy Group memberships of a peer and all messages should be kept conﬁdential.
This amounts to some form of receiver anonymity, since the adversary is unable
to deduce which messages of all the messages received by a user are actually
of interest to him, i.e., there is cover traﬃc.
Censorship-resistance No central entity should have the power to censor messages
based on their content, and the message propagation should not be fully
stopped by technical means. Simply put, this means that a message  once
it has been created and relayed to other mobile devices participating in the
network  can not be stopped from further propagation.
3.1.4 Adversary Model
An adversary model is considered in which there is a distinction between wide-area
network (WAN) communications, e.g., for any communication conducted over the
Internet, and local point-to-point communications deployed in the peer-to-peer (P2P)
network. We assume that the adversary is not able to break cryptographic primitives.
The capabilities of the WAN adversary are:
• All WANs are under full passive control of the respective operators. The ad-
versary can monitor and log all such communication channels used.
• Shut-downs of central communication infrastructures (kill-switches) occur.
The capabilities of the P2P adversary are:
• Limited local jamming, monitoring or logging of radio links is possible.
21
3 Microblogging Solution
• Malicious peers with full control of the communication channels used exist.
• Participating peers are not compromised by malicious ones.
With respect to the adversary properties from Section 3.1.2 the considered ad-
versary in this thesis has the following capabilities: for WAN communications the
adversary is an active one with global visibility and external participation. For the
P2P communications the adversary is an active one with local visibility, dynamic
mobility, and internal participation.
3.2 Architecture
The proposed microblogging solution Mobile Peer to Mobile Peer (MoP-2-MoP)
builds upon mobile peers that interact with their smartphones using point-to-point
communication links once they are physically close (technically they form an un-
structured peer-to-peer overlay network). The requirements of this microblogging
solution are the following:
• It should probabilistically propagate the messages issued by any user at some
point in time in the absence of an attacker.
• It should provide the stipulated privacy and security goals of anonymity, pri-
vacy and censorship-resistance as deﬁned in Section 3.1.3.
• It should be secure against the adversary modeled in Section 3.1.4.
• The microblogging solution should work with commodity-of-the-shelf hard-
ware, i.e., smartphones, and should be as intuitively to use as possible.
The rest of this section yields the overview of the microblogging infrastructure
in Section 3.2.1, followed by a description of its core functional components in Sec-
tions 3.2.23.2.5.
3.2.1 Infrastructure and System Overview
First a broader infrastructure overview is presented and then a more speciﬁc system
overview is given in this section.
Infrastructure Overview
The considered microblogging system is a decentralized, distributed peer-to-peer net-
work made up of mobile peers. The peers are humans carrying a mobile device (such
as a smartphone). Speciﬁcally, the mobile peers are considered to form a dynam-
ically changing peer-to-peer network, where the movement patterns correspond to
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Figure 3.1: Schematic overview of the microblogging infrastructure.
the natural movements of the smartphone owners. All peers maintain a local buﬀer
of encrypted messages. Whenever two peers are physically close to each other they
exchange messages based on a ﬁxed strategy (described in Section 3.2.5). By this
local message exchange, the system aims at propagating new messages through the
entire network. This process is referred to as peer synchronization. In case network
segmentation occurs, peers can  as a backup solution  also download messages
from servers using a wide-area communication network by an action called server
synchronization; note that there can be multiple such servers, as they only serve as
additional channel to transfer messages.
Figure 3.1 shows a schematic overview of the infrastructure. Peers are depicted by
a smartphone-like shape, where nindex represent diﬀerent peers. The dotted ellipses
named Crowd A and Crowd B represent clusters of peers which are physically close to
each other so that peer message synchronization is possible. Consider the following
example: suppose that user ni acts as originator of a message; as soon as ni and nj
are close, they initiate a peer synchronization of their message buﬀers; this results
in the new messages being spread. This way, the message sent by ni ﬁnally reaches
all other physically close peers in Crowd A (nl and nk in the ﬁgure) through peer
synchronizations, depicted as dashed lines. The original encrypted message gets re-
randomized at each hop so that a global adversary cannot link exchanged messages.
A physically distant Crowd B can get the messages via two diﬀerent mechanisms.
First, a peer nk can physically move close to a peer in Crowd B and initiate a peer
synchronization there. As second option, one member of Crowd A (nl) can upload
his local messages to a server, which oﬀers the possibility of a server synchronization
with any member nm of Crowd B; subsequently the message can further spread via
peer synchronizations.
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In order to satisfy the by design wanted conﬁdentiality and unlinkability of mes-
sages, they are encrypted using a variant of the ElGamal encryption scheme that
oﬀers the possibility of re-randomizing ciphertexts without knowledge of the public
key (for details see Section 3.2.2). The sender of a message can designate the message
to a certain group by encrypting it with an appropriate group key; the exchange of
group keys is based on social trust and outlined in Section 3.2.4. Whenever a peer
receives messages, it checks whether he can decrypt them using any available group
keys. By default messages get re-randomized before being sent to other peers during
peer synchronizations.
In summary, a peer-based intra-crowd message dispersal is assumed, where the
transmission of encrypted messages takes place in an opportunistic manner using a
prioritized peer synchronization strategy. The inter-crowd dissemination with servers
is included, since crowd segmentation may occur and the movement of nodes may
not fully overcome these segmentations. Therefore, nodes can sporadically go online
for server synchronizations (cf. Section 3.2.5).
System Overview
A schematic overview of the peer synchronization process is given in Figure 3.2: nodes
belong to groups and each node has a group key for each of its own groups, i.e., all
the groups it is a member of, in order to be able to encrypt and decrypt messages
belonging to those groups. These keys are stored in a node's key store, e.g., the Keys
of Node1.
Each node maintains its local storage of encrypted messages, containing messages
of groups it is a member of, as well as messages of other groups it is not a member of
(and unable to decrypt). In this way, a decentralized storage of messages is created
across all nodes. Any node can encrypt a new message under one of its group keys
and put it in its storage for propagation.
Send buffer
Node1 Node2
Local storage
Send buffer
Peer sync
Own
Groups
Other
Groups
decrypt
select &
Keys
decr.re-encrypt
encrypt
Figure 3.2: Schematic overview of the peer synchronization process.
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Send buﬀers contain the messages to be exchanged in peer syncs. Prior to each
peer sync they are ﬁlled in accordance to a ﬁxed synchronization strategy. This
determines how nodes select the send buﬀer messages out of their local storages.
The diﬀerent synchronization strategies used are described later in Section 3.2.5 of
this chapter.
Peer synchronizations propagate the messages and are initiated whenever two
nodes are in proximity of each other. During a peer synchronization two nodes, i.e.,
Node1 and Node2, bidirectionally exchange their a priori prepared send buﬀers. The
exchange is conducted over a direct wireless point-to-point link established between
the nodes ad-hoc when they are in communication range. Upon receiving a send
buﬀer a node has to decrypt each message and check if it belongs to one of the groups
it is a member of by trying to decrypt every message by every key it possesses. Then
the messages are sorted into its local storage. In this way, messages are distributed
across the nodes.
To achieve unlinkability  and thus anonymity  all nodes have to re-encrypt
the encrypted messages each time before being resent in a peer synchronization.
The cryptographic scheme must allow any node to re-encrypt any already encrypted
message, regardless of whether the node is in possession of that speciﬁc group key
or not. Therefore, a cryptographic scheme capable of universal re-encryption such
as [56] has to be used.
Intuitively, the construction supports the following security properties: the goals
of sender and receiver anonymity are achieved by the unlinkability of the in- and
outgoing messages relayed from node to node via peer synchronization combined
with the selection of messages pooled in the local storages. By encrypting all mes-
sages conﬁdentiality is kept. Censorship-resistance is achieved by the decentralized,
distributed nature of the peer-to-peer system which has no single point of failure.
The key diﬀerences of the approach used in this thesis to achieve anonymity com-
pared to the approaches crowds and mixes (cf. Section 2.1), are the following: both
crowds and mixes contain speciﬁc (uni-)cast routing and they are both developed
for session-oriented ﬁxed-line web communications, whereas our approach is based
on a delay-tolerant networking scenario. This means that the messages spread ag-
nostic to routing by direct communications only, i.e., peer synchronization. In this
way the proposed solution has no routing overhead at all. Importantly, universal
re-encryption is deployed instead of a layered one in this approach. This ensues,
as stated in Section 3.2.2, that no message has to be decrypted multiple times in
order to obtain the plaintext, albeit the node has to decrypt the message under the
correct key by trial and error until the node has either no other keys to decrypt or
has decrypted the ciphertext to the correct plaintext. This simplicity is by design in
order to build a decentralized and peer-to-peer based microblogging infrastructure.
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3.2.2 Universal Re-Encryptable ElGamal
A peer who is not a member of a group is not able to decrypt messages sent in that
group. Also, a peer is not able to learn anything from messages he cannot decrypt
(such as the public key it is encrypted with). Nevertheless he needs to be able to
re-randomize all encryptions to provide unlinkability.
It is well-known that ElGamal ciphertexts can be re-randomized, but this operation
requires knowledge of the public key. However, we can not employ such a solution
directly, as it would contradict sender anonymity, since knowledge of the public key
associated with a message allows to determine group membership of the message.
In order to be able to re-randomize ciphertext even in case the public key is not
available, a variant of the ElGamal encryption scheme introduced in [56] is used to
obtain universal re-encryption.
In a cyclic, multiplicative group (G, ·) of prime order p with neutral element 1,
on input of an ElGamal public key pk = (g, h) ∈ G2 and a message m ∈ G, the
encryption is composed of two parts: (i) an ElGamal encryption of m using pk and
(ii) a random encryption of the neutral element 1, which allows for re-randomizing
the ciphertext. Thus, the following tuple corresponds to an encryption of a message
m, where two integers r1, r2 ∈ Zp are chosen uniformly at random:
c = (c1, c2, c3, c4) := (g
r1 , hr1 ·m, gr2 , hr2).
Now (c1, c2) is a textbook ElGamal encryption of m while (c3, c4) is a random en-
cryption of the neutral element 1. Re-randomization can be performed by choosing
two integers t1, t2 ∈ Zp uniformly at random and computing the re-randomized ci-
phertext c′:
c′ = (c′1, c
′
2, c
′
3, c
′
4) := (c1 · ct13 , c2 · ct14 , ct23 , ct24 ).
Due to the homomorphic properties of ElGamal the tuple (c′1, c′2) is again an ElGa-
mal encryption of some (possibly unknown) m and (c′3, c′4) is another encryption of
1 (both under the same public key). Re-randomization is based entirely on informa-
tion present in the ciphertext and access to the public key pk is not required. For
decryption, since the public key under which the encryption was done is unknown, it
must ﬁrst be checked if (c′3, c′4) decrypts to 1 before decrypting the actual message.
3.2.3 Message Format and Storage
The message format follows the hash-and-encrypt concept to achieve integrity, where
a keyed hash is used (Message Authentication Code, HMAC) instead of a plain hash
to achieve authenticity within the set of group members. Logically, a message m
consists of a timestamp t concatenated with the 140 character message text msg
preceded by their HMAC,
m = HMAC(t || msg) || t || msg.
26
3.2 Architecture
Subsequently, the message is ElGamal encrypted as described in the previous section.
(Note that any kind of hybrid encryption is not possible here, as it would not easily
allow re-randomization of the message when it is forwarded; note further that due
to the randomized nature of ElGamal the use of a special mode of operation is not
necessary.)
Each peer maintains a message buﬀer of a ﬁxed size, which is ﬁlled with incoming
messages. Upon receipt of any new message, a peer checks whether it belongs to a
group that the peer is interested in. This is done by brute-forcing: the peer tries to
decrypt the message with all private group keys the node has; if decryption works,
the message is part of a group that the peer is interested in. The decrypted message
is shown to the user unless the message was already received before. This brute-force
decryption step is necessary because we do not tag messages with any sort of group
identiﬁer, which would open the possibility of message linking attacks.
3.2.4 Group and Key Management
We assume that the global system parameters of the encryption scheme, i.e., the
cyclic, multiplicative group (G, ·), is already present in the implementation of any
client. Whenever a new message group is formed, the responsible peer  of which
every group has one  creates an asymmetric ElGamal key pair, which identiﬁes the
new group. All members of a group possess both the public key and the private key
of the ElGamal key plus a group-speciﬁc secret required to compute the HMAC for
their group messages.
A key propagation mechanism that is based on social trust is assumed.1 Whenever
two nodes are close to each other, one node can introduce the other one to a group
by initiating the exchange of the group ElGamal key pair. This key can, for example,
be sent from one device to another one using NFC transmission or an optical channel
(such as a barcode that is scanned by the other device). Key revocation is done by
forming a new group and discarding the old group keys.
An important aspect for the microblogging system to work is thus the key sharing
and propagation mechanism. Ideally, it should be intiuitive as well as secure. One
approach to remedy this problem is devised in [83]. The idea is to use common hand
shaking of the users with their small mobile devices in their hands  such as smart-
phones in the scenario treated in this thesis  to mutually authenticate users and
subsequently exchange keys. The approach is based on sensing and analysing the
actual shaking movement of two users' devices to securely authenticate the users.
In a user study the method was proven to be intuitively usable. The interested
reader can ﬁnd a comprehensive survey of mobile device association techniques in
[25]. Nevertheless, key management and sharing in this thesis are treated as a re-
1Note that this problem is not treated in this dissertation.
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placeable black box, with the possibility of advanced group key agreement schemes
being implemented at another point in time.
The use of group encryption schemes contained in an outer ElGamal encryption
layer would be a possible extension. But adding or revoking users is costly and
requires nodes to be online for re-keying [13]. A group in this scheme can also re-key
or decide to use a key pair only for a speciﬁed period of time and then use another
key pair; as long as the system-wide public parameters for the key generation are
used, the newly created keys are usable out-of-the-box.
3.2.5 Synchronization of Messages
The architecture supports two synchronization methods, peer synchronization (in
short peer sync) and server synchronization (in short server sync), which are de-
scribed subsequently.
Peer Synchronization
Nodes in this scenario do not manage any routing information for peer sync op-
erations, but use local communication (such as such as Bluetooth or ad-hoc WiFi
connections) once other peers come into reach. Optical links such as infrared on the
IrDA protocol stack are also feasible means of message transfer, but not commonly
present in current smartphones [15].
The message buﬀers of all peers are of ﬁxed size, and there can be diﬀerent strate-
gies to prioritize messages during peer syncs. We stress that this buﬀer does not
only contain messages that the peer can decrypt, but also other messages; this is
necessary to ensure an appropriate spread of all messages. The following strategies2
are proposed:
Prioritized A fraction p of the send buﬀer is allocated to messages of those groups
that the sending peer has subscribed; the other fraction 1 − p of slots goes
to other messages. Both slots are ﬁlled randomly with respective messages
from the message buﬀer. PR0.4 syncing thus means that 40% of the buﬀer is
ﬁlled with messages from groups the node is a member of, and 60% are ﬁlled
uniformly at random with messages of other groups. This allows to prioritize
own messages.
Random The send buﬀer is ﬁlled uniformly at random with messages from the node's
message buﬀer.
2Note that the strategy Round Robin and Latest Only have been dropped during the simulations,
since the results of Round Robin have been similar to Random and the results of Latest Only
did not show suﬃcient message spread in most scenarios.
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Round Robin The send buﬀer is sequentially and block-wise ﬁlled with messages
out of the local storage.
Latest Only Only the latest messages received are put into the send buﬀer and sent
at the next sync operation.
The propagation speed of the messages is clearly dependent on the deployed syn-
chronization strategy. The random drawing of messages is beneﬁcial for privacy, as it
does not signal group memberships to peers, in contrast to the prioritized mechanism.
In order to not leak the amount of exchanged messages, a ﬁxed number of messages
is sent (alternatively a lower bound on the number of sent messages can be estab-
lished). To fulﬁll these constraints (in particular during the initial bootstrapping
phase at the beginning of the use of the microblogging system), dummy messages
are randomly created by a peer; alternatively a peer can engage in a ﬁrst server sync
to ﬁll its message buﬀer before performing a peer sync.
The used technology for the point-to-point communication allows peers to initiate
a peer sync manually, automatically, or semi-automatically. A manual peer sync
would require peers to consciously connect their smartphones with other peers (e.g.,
by a short-ranged optical link). In manual mode the peer sync takes place only if
it is actively conﬁrmed by the user, based on existing social trust relationships. In
automatic mode the peer sync runs in the background in discovery mode and syncs
whenever another peer is available and in reach. In semi-automatic mode a user
needs to be added to a white-list ﬁrst before syncs can take place. For example,
for direct wireless LAN connections this could be achieved by recording the Medium
Access Control (MAC) address of the network adapter. This strategy lowers the
probability of peer syncs with untrusted devices. Nodes are thus able to synchronize
messages more or less restrictively, based on how risk-averse they are.
This means, there is a continuum ranging from very risk-averse behavior, i.e., only
manual peer syncs with known devices in range takes place, over risk-neutral, i.e., semi-
automatic peer syncs with automatic peer-syncing with known devices and manual
syncing for unknown devices, to risk-prone, i.e., automatic peer syncs with all reach-
able devices regardless of whether they are known or unknown devices. The more
risk-averse the node is, the less messages get relayed over it, diminishing the overall
performance of the system. The more risk-prone a node is, the more messages get
relayed over it, augmenting the overall performance of the system. However, nodes
expose themselves more if they peer-sync semi-automatically or automatically, mak-
ing them more susceptible for adversarial attacks.
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Figure 3.3: Extended infrastructure overview of the microblogging architecture.
Server Synchronization
Since diﬀerent crowds of nodes are likely to get separated if they are not geographi-
cally close or socially connected, the option of downloading encrypted messages from
servers is provided. Node movement might be a remedy against the segmentation of
crowds over diﬀerent boroughs of a city and even diﬀerent towns. Nevertheless, if
crowds are segmented by country borders or continents, a message spread only via
node movement is improbable to unachievable. Server syncs thus provide an alter-
native means of message transportation in these scenarios. As seen in Figure 3.3,
the connectivity might either be given through mobile telecommunication networks
such as GSM (Global System for Mobile Communications), UMTS (Universal Mo-
bile Telecommunications System) and LTE (Long-Term Evolution) cell towers, or
wireless LAN access points.
During a server sync a node uploads its send buﬀer to the server and downloads
new messages from it. Servers are only a data sink that can neither decrypt the
messages, nor determine group memberships of messages. There may be several
servers available for server syncs and they merely provide a means for on-demand
message transfers (cf. Chapter 6 for both this basic exchange and the multi-client
ORAM approach to server-sync messages).
A server sync is triggered by a node sporadically and only if it decides to do so.
The Internet access could be done over an anonymity network such as Tor [39] to
increase node anonymity during communication with a server.
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3.3 Analysis
In this section we discuss to which extent the stated privacy and security goals can
be met according to the assumed adversary capabilities stipulated in Section 3.1.4.
3.3.1 Privacy
The privacy of a node during any synchronization is guaranteed, since the exchanged
messages look completely random to a global passive adversary and no group mem-
berships can be derived from the encrypted messages themselves (due to the un-
linkability and indistinguishability of the re-encrypted messages). Messages are
peer-synced by peers irrespectively of the nodes' group memberships and the re-
randomized messages can not be identiﬁed, linked or traced by the adversary. Only
if a prioritized synchronization strategy is used that favors messages that a peer is a
member of and if a malicious node compromised the speciﬁc key, group aﬃliations can
be leaked. Generally however, the adversary does not know if a (non-compromised)
node is able to decrypt any of the messages or not (thus learning its group member-
ships) because the internal processing of the received messages by the node is not
visible to the adversary, e.g., the messages that the node is able to decrypt and read.
Thus, the adversary is not able to draw information based on the observed ciphertext
exchanges and it can not derive group aﬃliations, resulting in the conﬁdentiality of
group memberships and message content.
3.3.2 Anonymity
The solution's goal is to achieve full anonymity by the means of unlinkability, im-
plying receiver and sender anonymity. Especially the peer synchronizations in the
delay-tolerant networking are beneﬁcial for anonymity, because the original sender
of a message and any receivers can hardly be traced by the global passive adversary
who is unable to decrypt the messages.
Server synchronizations require wide area network (WAN) communication using
the smartphone. These means of communication are more susceptible to monitoring
because data retention of cell towers and WiFi logins exists which allows for accurate
tracking via device identiﬁers, e.g., International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI),
or International Mobile Station Equipment Identity (IMEI). Since server syncs are
optional and queried by nodes on-demand only, the only information the adversary
can gain is that the node is participating in the network and no derivation of original
senders is possible.
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3.3.3 Censorship-Resistance
The resistance to censorship is based on the distributed and decentralized storage of
the messages, the local peer syncs, and a censor who has no access to the group keys.
But even if the censor was able to get to know some keys, he is not able to fully stop
the exchange of the messages encrypted under those keys. This is the case, since
the censor only has a limited visibility of the P2P communications taking place and
cannot shut down all the peer syncs that take place altogether (cf. P2P adversary
in Section 3.1.4). Filtering on a semantic level is also not possible, neither by the
passive global adversary nor by malicious nodes, because of the indistinguishability of
all ciphertexts. Again, if the censor was able to get hold of some keys and made them
available to the malicious nodes, they could ﬁlter out the messages encrypted under
those keys, thus lowering  but not stopping  the spread of the aﬀected messages.
The result is therefore the inability of the censor to read or trace any message or
to perform content-based ﬁltering. This leaves a complete or partial communication
shutdown or deletion of ciphertexts as possible measures for the adversary to censor.
For all WAN communications, disabling the server would suﬃce, as would re-
gional communication shutdowns or disruptions of the Internet; both of which are
not preventable. However, the architecture is designed to operate without WAN
communications exclusively using local communications. Therefore, the architecture
has to withstand local jamming of the network by an adversary that deploys jam-
mers to block radio frequencies. This renders radio links in the jammer's sphere of
inﬂuence unusable, because of electro-magnetic interference.
A potential remedy to jamming is the use of optical point-to-point links, although
currently uncommon in smartphones. The line of sight required for optical peer-
syncs is beneﬁcial in this scenario and technologies such as IrSimple [2] and its
successors would allow for bulk message synchronizations in less than one second. If
optical peer-syncing is carried out based on social trust relations/personal encounters,
censorship could be further hampered.
Consequently, the approach taken in the simulation runs with censorship (cf. Sec-
tion 4.3.2) allows the censor to limited local jamming, so that a certain percentage
of the peers in the network are blocked from conducting peer syncs.
3.4 Limitations
The task of building an anonymity system is not a simple undertaking. As outlined
in [35], it is achievable if no one is logging or watching, or if the communication is of
an one-oﬀ type, e.g., whistle blowing by shipping a ﬂash drive once only requires the
sender to engage in communications one time, and not repeatedly, thus minimizing
the chances of being observed. Also, if inﬁnite budget for covert traﬃc is feasible or if
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steganographic or covert communications with high latency and a low bandwidth are
suﬃcient, anonymity can be achieved rather easily. The same applies if using malware
and bot nets is a viable option to create cover traﬃc. However, anonymity is a severe
problem if the communication is periodic and persistent, and if the anonymity has
to withstand against an adversary able to observe things, i.e., adversaries that have
a high visibility of the network. Also using solely commodity of-the-shelf hardware
and communication technologies makes building an anonymity system more diﬃcult.
The same applies to a high-bandwidth, low-latency network if a high reliability is
needed.
The mobile anonymous microblogging system devised in this thesis has of course no
easier standpoint when it comes to building an anonymity system. The smartphones
used are equipped with a subscriber identiﬁcation module (SIM) that is intended to
securely store the international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI) number. The mo-
bile network providers can thus trace the movement of the smartphone as it logs into
the cell towers in communication range using this IMSI-number. Detailed proﬁling
of movement patterns is thus possible. Combined with limited local monitoring and
logging of communications this could, however, create a communication graph of who
is performing peer syncs with whom, e.g., by technically collecting quasi-identiﬁers of
the device such as media access control addresses (MAC-addresses) for WiFi. Even
an adversary that has only a limited visibility of the P2P communication that takes
place could then use community detection to reveal the communication patterns and
show the degree of connectivity of a node and the frequency of its peer syncs. These
results could be leveraged as a side-channel for assumed group aﬃliations. If the
peer syncs were conducted by optical links over a short distance, they would become
technically undetectable based on radio emissions. Local monitoring would then
be diﬃcult and require shoulder surﬁng, i.e., surreptitiously scrutinizing someone
else's smartphone activities over the user's shoulder. Also, correlation attacks of
side-channel information from OSN social graphs with anonymous location patterns
of users have been shown to successfully identify nodes [120]. These attacks can
only be circumvented by users through either disabling communications that allow
location tracking or by actively obfuscating their location data [116].
Similarly, Internet service providers (ISP) can log the Internet communication that
takes place, often due to lawful interception and data retention requirements. This
information is thus generally produced during normal usage of commodity of-the-
shelf hardware. This has been stated in Section 3.3 and additionally the stipulated
adversary model in Section 3.1.4 covers such malicious behavior to some extent. Yet,
this information is generally gathered during normal usage and can only by mitigated
by the use of an anonymity system such as Tor.
Nevertheless, in a real-world scenario compromised nodes are to be expected. Self-
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ish nodes in the architecture might only propagate their own groups' messages and
could thus compromise their group memberships in case of a compromised group
member or group key.3 Compromised key-material after the theft of a device or its
infection with malware such as hardware trojans is possible. Such occurrences are
not the exception but rather the rule and must be met by an anonymity system
in order to mitigate possible damages. Backdoors, i.e., device functionality hidden
from the user and only accessible to the developers which have implanted it on the
device may also be triggered to compromise a node or update ﬁrmware without the
user's consent. This is of course an ambivalent practice, since some users tend to not
update their devices regularly and thus would have a longer window of vulnerabil-
ity for known vulnerabilities; and the other backdoor vulnerabilites are intentionally
persistent until they might get removed properly. On the other hand, users can
also obtain malicious code on their devices via installed third-party software and
any form of potentially unwanted programs. Also, trusted operating systems and a
secured hardware and software stack cannot generally be anticipated in a real-world
scenario which uses commodity of-the-shelf hardware and are out of scope for the
considerations done in this thesis, leaving the nodes naturally vulnerable to a certain
extent. This issue can only be circumvented by using dedicated devices, i.e., smart-
phones with deliberately minimized functionality, for instance solely for messaging
or telephoning or emailing etc., in order to shield the target's surface. With respect
to the problem at hand using dedicated hardened devices would inevitably shrink
the userbase, an eﬀect that contradicts the requirement stated in Section 3.2, i.e.,
the microblogging solution should work with commodity-of-the-shelf smartphones,
and should be as intuitively to use as possible. As a result this means, even though
the microblogging solution is designed in a way that the desired privacy and security
guarantees are met, there exist factors during the actual deployment of the solution
that are not controllable by the solution itself. The solution must then adapt to the
threats as they arise and try to mitigate the possible damage of them.
Of course, there are also numerous other limitations besides the technical ones
discussed above, e.g., socio-philosophical.4
3Please note that this is opposed to the wanted anonymity and privacy goals of the system.
4From a socio-philosophical perspective Privacy-by-Design(PbD) aims  in a continuum  to either
negatively-defensively protect data or to positively-enablingly allow the user to autonomously
deﬁne what personal data to share; with post-privacy advocates as one extreme. On the other
hand, a culturally pessimistic view sees an era of Internet-Biedermeier with no über -individual
content in a seemingly innate Universum der Gemütlichkeit (G. Anders) dawning. Are tech-
nologies a social acteur, deﬁned ethno-graphically, cultural-anthropologically? Would a tech-
nocratic PbD thus be a paternalistic Gängelband allowing for no private communications in
public communications? And mobile private communications thus only be a Kommunikation
zwischen Fremden (R. Sennert) within the general public? [89]
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3.5 Demonstrator
This section exempliﬁes how the microblogging solution could look like, when imple-
mented on a smartphone  using peer syncs only. Section 3.5.1 illustrates the setup
and the use cases of the demonstrator, and Section 3.5.2 shows the use cases of the
actual prototypical implementation of the microblogging system.
3.5.1 Setup and Use Cases
This section shows the setup of the demonstrator and describes the use cases to be
accomplished by the demonstrator. Note, that the demonstrator system uses only
peer syncs.
The simulation server S runs a simulation of the mobile human users that move
around and microblog as described in Chapter 4, i.e., the simulation creates all
nodes, assigns their group memberships, creates their movements, and generates
messages that get distributed via peer syncs. The users and their movements are
visualized on the screen of the simulation server. Two real users A and B can use
two actual smartphones as shown in the overall demonstrator setup in Figure 3.4.
On the smartphones these users run a microblogging app which interacts with the
simulation running on the server. The communication in this demonstrator is done
using wiﬁ; an access point connects the three entities. The basic use case is that the
real users get automatically subscribed to groups, once they connect to the server.
They can then obtain messages of the groups they have been subscribed to, or they
can themselves create new groups. The joining of a new group can be done by a
key exchange between the two users; it is realised by scanning QR-codes. For all the
groups user A and B are a member of  initially assigned ones, newly created ones,
or groups joined by physically obtaining the key from the other real user  they can
create new messages on their own that get injected to the simulation, i.e., custom
messages besides the ones auto-generated by the simulation. The injected messages
Figure 3.4: Demonstrator setup showing the simulation server S and the two actual smart-
phones operated by user A and B, all of which are linked via an wiﬁ access point.
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then become part of the simulation and they are spread via peer syncs as nodes
have encounters. If both A and B are members of identical groups they can thus
eventually receive messages from each other which they have themselves created and
injected into the simulation.
3.5.2 Implementation
Based on the use case requirements an app was programmed for the smartphone op-
erating system Android, that allowed two user-operated real smartphones to connect
to the simulation. Figure 3.5(a) shows the main screen that contains a list of all the
groups the user is a member of, followed by a timestamp of the latest message received
in that group and the actual latest message received in that particular group. The
messages that contain a text in the format Msg# x are auto-generated messages of
the simulation, whereas all other messages are examples of user-generated messages
that have been injected into the simulation. A user can touch upon a group entry
and is then shown a screen with a timeline of all messages received in the selected
group and a text input ﬁeld that allows for the creation of new messages.
Group key exchange is done using QR-Codes, i.e., one user loads the QR-code
represenation of the group key of which the key is to be exchanged to the screen 
this is exemplary shown in Figure 3.5(b). The other user then uses the app to take a
photograph of the shown QR-code group key and in this way receives the membership
of this group. The app is designed in a way to allow for other mechanisms of group
key exchange, e.g., Near Field Communication (NFC).
The use case of creating a new group can be carried out by the user by touching
the settings icon of the application and then selecting the Create new group-button.
(a) Main screen. (b) QR-Code screen.
Figure 3.5: Sample screenshots of the microblogging demonstrator app: (a) main screen
showing the latest messages (b) screen for QR-Code-based group key exchange.
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The user is then prompted for a new group name in order to create the new group.
The mobile human users that move around and create messages have been made
visible for the demonstrator by adding OpenStreetMap's map material and its way-
point information, i.e., a representation of the roads and ways that nodes can walk
upon, to the simulation. The extension is realized as an Docker image that hosts an
OpenStreetMap-Tileserver, containing a dump of the actual OpenStreetMap data of
the project, alongside the waypoint information. Once an area of the map is selected
by zooming into the area of interest, the simulation can be started and users get
spawned on the waypoints and begin to move around. The users are restricted in
their movements based on the selected map area, so that they cannot move out of
the area shown on the screen. Whenever a node reaches a border of the selected
area, it makes a u-turn in order to stay within the selected area. Figure 3.6 shows
a snapshot of the simulation running with the OpenStreetMap-Tileserver and the
users  depicted by the small cellular phone-like shapes  on the map's waypoints.
Figure 3.6: Demonstrator: snapshot of the simulation with the OpenStreetMap-Tileserver
and simulation-linked smartphone nodes on the map's waypoints.
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Chapter4
Feasibility of the Message Distribution Using Peer Syncs
This chapter thoroughly evaluates and analyzes the feasibility of the mobile dis-
tributed microblogging system based on users carrying their mobile devices as de-
scribed in Section 3.2  using only peer syncs. As stated, the system goals are
anonymity, message conﬁdentiality, and censorship-resistance. All messages are en-
crypted under a group key, and they are stored across all nodes in a decentralized
fashion.
The insights of this chapter are threefold:
• The feasibility of the mobile microblogging system is shown experimentally
using simulations with both synthetic and empirical mobility datasets.
• Diﬀerent networking setups are simulated to gain insights on how they aﬀect
message spread.
• The system is evaluated under adversarial conditions, its limitations are dis-
cussed, and lessons learned are stated.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.1 details the diﬀerent
synthetic and empirical mobility datasets used to conduct the simulations, followed
by a description of the simulation setup and the evaluation of the simulation's results
in Section 4.2. The system's performance under adversarial conditions is investigated
in Section 4.3. In Section 4.4 the ﬁndings are discussed and a conclusion is drawn.
4.1 Mobility Inputs
In order to evaluate the ﬁtness for use of the presented solution, a discrete, event-
based simulation is run which simulates the behavior of the smartphone carrying
users, i.e., the nodes. It is the underlying mobility of the nodes that facilitates
spreading of the messages. To that end, the movement of the nodes and its char-
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acteristics are described by the means of networking metrics in this section.1 Two
diﬀerent classes of mobility datasets are taken as input to the simulation: empiri-
cal data collected in three diﬀering scenarios, and synthetic data created using the
BonnMotion [3] mobility framework.
The following networking metrics are used to outline key characteristics of the
data:
• Node degree is deﬁned as the number of neighboring nodes which a node en-
counters within a period of two hours.
• Meeting duration in seconds is deﬁned as the average duration of the encounters
a node has.
• Meetings per node per day is the average number of meetings per day a node
takes part in.
4.1.1 Empirical Mobility Data
Three empirical mobility datasets have been used in this thesis, from which input
data to the simulation has been extracted:
• The Bluetooth dataset [111] comprises 285 smartphone users, i.e., nodes, com-
municating using the Bluetooth technology. The total duration of the dataset
is 120 days and its source was an event at a congress center.
• The Nokia Mobile Data Challenge (NMDC) dataset [49] comprises GPS-traces
of 186 nodes over a period of 576 days. The area covered was approximately
77,000km2; however, the nodes were clustered in an area surrounding Lau-
sanne. Yet, some wandered into France, therefore the large area.
• The SUVnet Traces dataset [132] comprises 30 days of mobility traces of 4445
taxis from Shanghai and its surroundings. The GPS traces cover an area of
approximately 42,800km2. The Wireless and Sensor Networks Lab of Shanghai
Jiao Tong University provided these datasets.
Note that the NMDC and SUVnet datasets were originally GPS-traces and have
been processed using the BonnMotion [3] mobility framework so as to calculate the
earlier mentioned key characteristics of the datasets, e.g., node degree, meeting du-
ration, meeting per node per day. The Bluetooth dataset was obtained in a data
collection experiment where actual Bluetooth pairings between Bluetooth-enabled
smartphones took place which were recorded.
1Please note that the empirical mobility inputs to the simulation were gained in a collaborative
research project with signiﬁcant involvement of A. Barroso. For a more thorough description of
this data, please refer to [112].
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For the purpose of the simulation, it was assumed that any two nodes are in com-
munication range (and thus neighbors) if the distance between this pair of nodes was
lower or equal to 15m. This distance is technology-dependent and was deliberately
chosen, since it is at the discretion of us a reasonable upper bound if Bluetooth is
used as communication technology.
The selection of the emprical datasets was done in such a way, that the chosen
timeframe exhibits a high number of active nodes. This was necessary since the
activity of the nodes varied in the datasets. Also, the datasets cover a timeframe
of several months, a length that is considerably longer than the one needed for the
purposes of the simulation. The empirical datasets obtained from the the raw input
datasets are thus the following [112]:
• Congress1 and Congress2, obtained from the Bluetooth dataset: about 3.25
days each, 40 and 162 nodes, respectively.
• Lausanne1 and Lausanne2, obtained from the NMDC dataset: 2.5 days each,
141 and 137 nodes, respectively.
• Shanghai1 and Shanghai2, obtained from the SUVnet Traces: 2.5 days each,
4366 and 4347 nodes, respectively.
Table 4.1 shows the relevant statistics for the purpose of comparison. Besides
node count, meeting count states the total number of encounters between pairs of
nodes which took place. For node degree and meeting duration, also the mean, and
standard deviation and median are listed, followed by values that indicate meetings
per node, meetings per day and meetings per node per day.
We can see that the mean node degree for the Lausanne1 and Lausanne2 datasets
(2.49 and 2.73) are about twice as high as the mean node degrees of the Congress1 and
Congress2 datases, which are 1.19 and 1.39, respectively. The mean node degree of
the Shanghai datasets is 17.05 for Shanghai1 and 15.56 for Shanghai2, approximately
between ﬁve to sixteen times higher than the ones experienced in the Congress and
Lausanne datasets.
The mean meeting duration in seconds of the Shanghai datasets are 15.5 and 17.0,
and much lower than the ones from the Congress and Lausanne datasets which range
from 420 to 7406. This is the case, since the Congress and Lausanne datasets are
the traces of human beings at a conference and on campus, whereas the Shanghai
traces are the ones of taxis.
The mean meetings per node per day show again values for the Congress and Lau-
sanne datasets that are signiﬁcantly lower than the ones for the Shanghai datasets.
They range from 10.2 in Congress1 to 16.5 in Lausanne2 and have values of 130 and
145 in Shanghai2 and Shanghai1, respectively.
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Table 4.1: Connectivity statistics of the empirical dataset samples. Source: [112].
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4.1.2 Synthetic Mobility Data
In order to evaluate the simulation over a broader set of mobility input datasets,
synthetic mobility models are used to generate mobility input datasets for the sim-
ulation. This is done to detect focal points at which the solution might not work
anymore.
The ManhattanGrid [41] and the GaussMarkov [18] models supplied by the Bon-
nMotion framework [3] were utilized to assess a wider set of mobility data. The
ManhattanGrid model creates nodes that move on predeﬁned paths laid out ac-
cording to a regular grid structure, and the GaussMarkov model creates nodes that
randomly walk and that change their direction of movement by chosing from a nor-
mal distribution whose mean is the respective old direction value. The node number
has been varied from 25 to 400 in increments of 25 nodes per step, resulting in 16
diﬀerent node numbers. The areas encompass a range from 1 to 70 km2 in incre-
ments of 0.5 km2 per step. The total duration of all synthetically created datasets
is 195.300 seconds, which is approximately 54 hours or 2.25 days. The goal of these
synthetic mobility datasets is to evaluate the boundary values of the densities in
which the microblogging solution is working.
Selected connectivity statistics for a number of the ManhattanGrid and Gauss-
Markov datasets are shown in Table 4.2 and Table 4.3, respectively. Both tables
show that the node degree is drastically decreasing once the area is larger than
10 km2. In general, an augmented node number for a given area implies a larger
node degree. This is particularly the case in areas from 1 to 5 km2. The Gauss-
Markov datasets' average node degree lies in between 0.0002 and 0.28, while the
ManhattanGrid datasets' mean node degree lies in between 0.0002 and 2. This is
the case, since the nodes move on a ﬁxed grid structure for the ManhattanGrid
mobility and thus meet more often than the freely moving nodes on a plane in the
GuassMarkov mobility.
The value of the mean meetings per node per day develops according to the node
degree's pattern. The values spanned a range from 0.2 in the most sparsely connected
ManhattanGrid dataset, i.e., 25 nodes on an area of 70 km2, to 3210 in the most
densely connected ManhattanGrid dataset, i.e., 400 nodes on an area of 1 km2. For
the GaussMarkov datasets, the mean meetings per node per day ranged from 0.3 in
the most sparsely connected dataset to 578 in the most densely connected dataset.
A change of the area's size or a change of the number of nodes only exhibits
an insigniﬁcant eﬀect on the meeting durations. The GaussMarkov dataset-values
spanned on average from 17.5 to 22.5 seconds, and the ManhattanGrid dataset-values
from 17.6 to 29.5 seconds.
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Table 4.2: Connectivity statistics of selected ManhattanGrid datasets.
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25 1 10754 0.12 0.016 27.2 430.2 4779.6 191.2
25 5 1530 0.016 0.003 25.5 61.2 680 27.2
25 10 579 0.006 0.002 25.1 23.2 257.3 10.3
25 25 163 0.002 0.001 23.8 6.5 72.4 2.9
25 40 78 0.001 0 21.1 3.1 34.7 1.4
25 55 53 0 0 20.7 2.1 23.6 0.9
25 70 28 0 0 22.7 0.6 12.4 0.2
100 1 178384 0.503 0.027 27.5 1783.8 79281.8 792.8
100 5 24369 0.067 0.007 26.8 243.7 10830.7 108.3
100 10 9645 0.025 0.003 25.3 96.5 4286.7 42.9
100 25 2592 0.007 0.002 25.4 25.9 1152 11.5
100 40 1529 0.004 0.001 25.1 15.3 679.6 6.8
100 55 970 0.003 0.001 25.5 9.7 431.1 4.3
100 70 754 0.002 0.001 26.4 7.5 335.1 3.4
250 1 1125221 1.273 0.048 27.6 4500.9 500098.2 2000.4
250 5 152501 0.165 0.011 26.4 610 67778.2 271.1
250 10 60008 0.064 0.006 26 240 26670.2 106.7
250 25 17424 0.018 0.003 25.7 69.7 7744 31
250 40 9214 0.009 0.002 24.2 36.9 4095.1 16.4
250 55 6116 0.006 0.002 24 24.5 2718.2 10.9
250 70 4544 0.004 0.001 23 18.2 2019.6 8.1
400 1 2888818 2.05 0.06 27.7 7222 1283919.1 3209.8
400 5 388756 0.264 0.013 26.6 971.9 172780.4 432
400 10 154915 0.104 0.008 26.2 387.3 68851.1 172.1
400 25 44969 0.029 0.004 25.2 112.4 19986.2 50
400 40 24223 0.015 0.003 24.5 60.6 10765.8 26.9
400 55 16355 0.01 0.002 24 40.9 7268.9 18.2
400 70 11327 0.007 0.002 23.7 28.3 5034.2 12.6
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Table 4.3: Connectivity statistics of selected GaussMarkov datasets.
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25 5 415 0.004 0.001 21.2 16.6 184.4 7.4
25 10 208 0.002 0.001 18.9 8.3 92.4 3.7
25 25 67 0.001 0 20.8 2.7 29.8 1.2
25 40 42 0 0 17.5 1.7 18.7 0.7
25 55 54 0 0 19.2 2.2 24 1
25 70 32 0 0 18.6 0.6 14.2 0.3
100 1 32046 0.068 0.004 20.7 320.5 14242.7 142.4
100 5 6676 0.014 0.003 20.8 66.8 2967.1 29.7
100 10 3249 0.007 0.002 20.5 32.5 1444 14.4
100 25 1313 0.003 0.001 20.7 13.1 583.6 5.8
100 40 782 0.002 0.001 20.9 7.8 347.6 3.5
100 55 554 0.001 0.001 20.1 5.5 246.2 2.5
100 70 477 0.001 0.001 21 4.8 212 2.1
250 1 202399 0.172 0.008 20.7 809.6 89955.1 359.8
250 5 41247 0.035 0.004 20.7 165 18332 73.3
250 10 20591 0.018 0.003 20.9 82.4 9151.6 36.6
250 25 8271 0.007 0.002 21.2 33.1 3676 14.7
250 40 4983 0.004 0.001 20.5 19.9 2214.7 8.9
250 55 3812 0.003 0.001 20.3 15.2 1694.2 6.8
250 70 2782 0.002 0.001 21 11.1 1236.4 4.9
400 1 520419 0.278 0.01 20.8 1301 231297.3 578.2
400 5 105195 0.056 0.004 20.9 263 46753.3 116.9
400 10 53369 0.028 0.003 20.7 133.4 23719.6 59.3
400 25 20945 0.011 0.002 20.7 52.4 9308.9 23.3
400 40 13268 0.007 0.002 20.7 33.2 5896.9 14.7
400 55 9638 0.005 0.001 20.7 24.1 4283.6 10.7
400 70 7649 0.004 0.001 20.5 19.1 3399.6 8.5
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4.2 Simulation of Microblogging System
The mobility input determines the possible peer-sync events and constitutes the net-
work on which the simulated microblogging system runs. The goals of the simulations
are to gain insights on the message propagation using real empirical data as well as
synthetic data. We ﬁrst characterize the simulation runs in Section 4.2.1 and then
we present the results of the simulations in Section 4.2.2.
4.2.1 Simulation Overview and Pseudocode
The message propagation of the system is assessed with a discrete, event-based sim-
ulation in which nodes synchronize their messages amongst themselves using local
point-to-point communication links established when close to each other, i.e., peer
syncs.
Flowchart Overview of the Simulation
The ﬂowchart in Figure 4.1 provides a simpliﬁed overview of the simulation based
on which we describe it in a more general way, before we give a more technical pseu-
docode description of the simulation. For the assessment of the message propagation
Node pairings / connectivity:
- Normal simulation runs
- Censored / Spammed runs
 
 For each simulation round
Output results    message spread sigma
Mobility input
Synthetic data:
- ManhattanGrid datasets
- GaussMarkov datasets
Empirical data:
- Congress datasets
- Lausanne datasets
- Shanghai datasets
Network initialisation
 
Group memberships:
- Power law distribution
- Based on empirical findings
Nodes: Group memberships | Local storage | Send buffer
 
Create new
messages
Fill send
buffer
Peer sync-
hronization
Update lo-
cal storage
Figure 4.1: Overview of the simulation.
in the microblogging system, the implementation of the discrete, event-based simu-
lation is conducted excluding central servers. The nodes, their movements and peer
syncs are the major factors that inﬂuence the message propagation.
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Mobility input to the simulation are the empirical and synthetic mobility datasets
presented in the preceding section. They determine the nodes' movement on a plane
according to the empirical or the generated mobility traces.
During network initialisation the nodes are created and their local message storage
and send buﬀer is set. The group memberships of each node are also assigned at
this stage. The formation of the groups are modeled to be similar to the empirical
ﬁndings extracted from existing microblogging data. The group memberships of each
node are drawn out of a discrete power-law distribution [28] with exponent α = 2.276
and xmin = 2. The same applies to the number of groups a node is a member of 
values which have empirically been computed in [74]. During simulations the group
memberships remain ﬁxed once they got initialized, i.e., there is no node churn.
However, in reality the group assignment is done by peers spreading the keys among
each other. The simulation results do not incorporate network churn, meaning that
nodes are online and do not go oine during a simulation run. Not modeled due to a
lack of accessible empiric mobility datasets are homophily and reciprocity, i.e., nodes
or clusters of nodes that have frequent physical contact based on their mobility are
assumed to be similar in their group memberships (interests). These correlations
may have numerous consequences which are out of scope for this thesis [74].
The mobility patterns processed during the mobility input are the foundation used
to derive node connectivity, i.e., the node pairings (peer syncs) that can take place.
We determine whether a given pair of nodes is eligible for a peer sync by setting
the maximum distance over which a peer sync can take place to 15 meters based
on Bluetooth characteristics (the Bluetooth standard states connections over up to
100 meters, but tests with several up-to-date smartphone models showed it did not
perform well for distances over 30 meters). For peer syncs, we do not take into
account meeting durations. A peer sync can thus also occur in cases where the
contact duration would be too short for current technologies to establish a link, e.g.,
the vehicular movements in the Shanghai datasets. (Note that this is not the case for
the Congress datasets, in which all links established are based on actual Bluetooth
pairings with successful data transfers that took place during data collection.)
Simulation rounds of 5 minutes duration are used in the simulation. At the be-
ginning of each round, the nodes create their new messages. The message creation
events, i.e., when a new message is initially created by a user, are sampled based
on empirical Twitter microblogging user behavior [130]. During every round each
group's number of newly created messages is obtained by a drawing out of a Poisson
distribution with λGroup = 0.21 · |Group|, |Group| being the number of peers in that
group. The sampled number of messages for each round and group are distributed
uniformly at random across the group members. Then, each node ﬁlls its send buﬀer
with a speciﬁed number of messages drawn out of the node's local storage according
47
4 Feasibility of the Message Distribution Using Peer Syncs
to the used synchornization strategy, e.g., Prioritized or Random. The third step
consists of the peer synchronizations. Each peer sync makes a pair of nodes exchange
their prepared send buﬀer as drawn by the ﬁxed synchronization strategy. Finally,
each node updates its local storage. The latest incoming messages from a peer sync
thereby shift out the oldest messages received.
Output results of the simulation are the sigma-values as described in Section 4.2.2.
Pseudocode Representation of the Simulation
A more technical pseudocode overview of the simulation is provided in the listing
below:
1 //1. Input:
2 // a. Mobility parameters
3 Mobility m = {"Congress1","Congress2","Lausanne1",
4 "Lausanne2","Shanghai1","Shanghai2",
5 "GaussMarkov1km2",...,"GaussMarkov70km2"
6 "ManhattanGrid1km2",...,"ManhattanGrid70km2"}
7 int iNum = 300
8 int rNum
9 int nNum
10 // b. Transmission parameters
11 int pMax = 3
12 bool isCensor = false
13 float pCensor = [0.00, ..., 1.00]
14 bool isSpam = false
15 float pSpam = [0.00, ..., 1.00]
16 int d = 15
17 // c. Node parameters
18 int bfSize = 100
19 int dbSize = 10000
20 Sync s = {"Prioritized", "Random", "Round Robin", "LatestOnly", "Psi"}
21 float pPrioritized = [0.00,...,1.00]
22 //2. Simulation:
23 // a. Create nodes and network
24 Node nodes[] = createNodes(nNum, bfSize, dbSize, s, pPrioritized)
25 nodes[].createGroupsAndMemberships(nNum)
26 nodes[].createAllMessageEvents()
27 if (nodes.s = "Psi") nodes.calculatePsiSetsForNodes()
28 Network net = createNetwork(m, nodes[], d, pMax, iNum, rNum, nNum,
29 isSpam, isCensor, pSpam, pCensor)
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30 // b. Run discrete round based simulation
31 for (int r = 0, r < rNum, r++) {
32 if(isSpam) net.setSpammingNodes()
33 if(isCensor) net.setCensoredNodes()
34 nodes[].updateSendBuffers()
35 nodes[].syncMessages()
36 }
37 //3. Output:
38 MessagePropagation sigma = [sigma_1, ..., sigma_rNum]
The input phase of the simulation, which is written in the object-oriented pro-
gramming language Java, consists ﬁrstly of the Mobility parameters, namely the
empirical mobility datasets and the synthetic mobility datasets Mobility m as de-
scribed in Section 4.1.2 and Section 4.1.1, respectively. They determine when nodes
are eligible for peer syncs. The variable iNum denotes the interval length of a simula-
tion round in seconds, i.e., 5 minutes. The total number of rounds in the simulation
rNum depends on the input m and in this case equals 500 rounds, i.e., around 1.7 days.
nNum is the number of nodes, as described in Sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2.
Further inputs are the Transmission parameters: pMax, which determines the
maximally allowed number of peer syncs per node per simulation round, the Boolean
value isCensor, which determines whether it is a censored simulation run or not
(with the variable pCensor as the percentage of the nodes that are censored and can
thus not peer-sync in a given round), the Boolean value isSpam, which determines
whether it is a spammed simulation run or not (with the variable pSpam as the
percentage of the nodes that spam), the variable d, which is the maximum distance
in meters over which nodes can conduct peer syncs, and the variable pPrioritized,
which indicates the percentage of a node's send buﬀer that is reserved for its own
group messages in a peer sync.
In 1.c., the Node parameters are bfSize as the amount of messages transferred
in a peer sync, dbSize as the maximum amount of messages stored locally in a node's
database, and Sync s as the followed synchronization strategy. The standard buﬀer
size is set to 100 messages and the local storage consists of 10,000 messages in each
node's database.
The second phase, the begin ot the actual simulation, starts on line 22 and cre-
ates and initializes the objects Node nodes[] and Network net with the already
described parameters in its ﬁrst step 2.a. Note that this creation takes place anew
in each complete run of the simulation to have enough sample runs. For the nodes the
functions createGroupsAndMemberships(nNum) and createAllMessageEvents() cre-
ate the number of groups and their members and the message creation per group and
node according to a power-law distribution and a Poisson distribution, respectively.
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The function calculatePsiSetsForNodes() calculates the intersection of the group
memberships for each pairwise diﬀerent pair of nodes, if the synchronization strategy
is "Psi" (cf. Chapter 5.1 in which this sync strategy is motivated and examined).
Step 2.b. conducts the actual simulation rounds and is iterated for the num-
ber of rounds rNum. In each round ﬁrst a check is done, whether it is a spammed
simulation run or a censored simulation run, and the functions of the net-object
setSpammingNodes() or setCensoredNodes() are used to mark its nodes as spam-
mers or being unable to communicate, i.e., censored, respectively. The function
nodes.updateSendBuffers() prepares the nodes' send buﬀers according to the cho-
sen sync strategy s, e.g., Prioritized or Random. During this process a node ﬁrst
checks if it has created messages itself, and, if this is the case, it adds them to the send
buﬀer. Then, the remaining send buﬀer is ﬁlled with messages of the nodes message
database in accordance with the deployed sync strategy. The nodes.syncMessages()-
function performs the actual syncs of the messages: all pairs of nodes that are within
the maximum allowed distance d over which a peer sync can take place are eligible to
conduct a peer sync. If a node has more possibilities to peer sync than the allowed
maximum number of peer syncs per node p, the peer syncs exceeding p for this node
are discarded. Each peer sync results in the exchange of the prepared send buﬀer
between the nodes, followed by the adding of the received messages in the nodes'
local databases.
In Section 4.2.2 we describe the sigma-values, which are the output of the simula-
tion.
4.2.2 Simulation Results
Before we discuss the results, we ﬁrst deﬁne global message spread σ and introduce
a notation for parameterized link settings. The results are then ﬁrst presented and
analyzed for the empirical Congress, Lausanne and Shanghai mobility inputs, and
then for the synthetic ManhattanGrid and GaussMarkov ones.
Global message spread σ
To evaluate the eﬀectiveness of the microblogging system, we use the global message
spread σ as metric, which is deﬁned as
σ =
∑
m∈M
recm
|groupm|
|M | ,
where M is the set of messages whose spreading is monitored, recm is the number of
group members (including the sender) who received message m, and |groupm| is the
number of group members belonging to the group under which message m has been
encrypted. Consequently, if one message m is received by all its group members,
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its spread is 1 (full spread), and if all messages are fully spread, the global message
spread is 1.
Parameterized Link Settings Λbp
As shorthand notation for parameterized link settings we introduce Λbp, with p being
the maximum allowed number of peer syncs per round and node, and b being the
size of the send buﬀer exchanged per peer sync. Various link settings are used in
the simulations to assess their eﬀects on message spread and to identify bottlenecks.
Bluetooth (Λ0.1k2 ) link settings limit the number of peer syncs to 2, i.e., even if a
larger number of peer syncs was possible a node peer-syncs with mostly 2 neighbors
per simulation round, and the message send buﬀer to 100 messages, in order to
adjust the link capacity settings to a contemporary transmission technology used
widely. Unlimited (Λ∞max) link settings allow all possible links to be used for peer
syncs, and the send buﬀer and the nodes' storages are unbounded. The Unlimited
link settings are chosen to test a hypothetical upper bound of a possible message
spread under conditions unconstrained by a given transmission technology and local
storage. Note that the local storage is only unbounded for Λ∞max, otherwise it is set
to 10,000 messages as stated above. Also, the peer sync strategies Random and PR
do not have any eﬀect for Λ∞max peer sync results.
Empirical Mobility Data Results
The results of the Congress1 (C1) and the Congress2 (C2) datasets are depicted
in Figures 4.2(a),(b). They show the message spread over time for three diﬀerent
sync strategies with error bars for selected points in time using Bluetooth (Λ0.1k2 )
link settings and the upper bound obtained when unlimited (Λ∞max) link settings are
applied. The smaller C1 sample reaches close to 50% global message spread after
500 rounds, the larger C2 sample slightly above 30% for random syncs. With PR0.4
syncs 75% is reached for both datasets, because the prioritized selection of messages
yields a better message spread. Even though the standard deviation is large, PR
peer syncs run with Bluetooth settings converge to the unlimited upper bound by a
margin of approx. 15-20%, whereas RD peer syncs perform much worse.
The Lausanne1 and Lausanne2 datasets depicted in Figures 4.3(a),(b) show sim-
ilar results: with Bluetooth settings, the Random, PR0.4 and PR1.0 sync methods
yield ﬁnal global message spreads slightly below 10%, and the spread with unlimited
settings reaches around 55%, even though the node number in Lausanne is similar
to the C2 dataset. These results are due to the large area covered by the nodes and
the bipartitioned network structure whose two node clusters have little exchanges of
messages between them as outlined in [112].
For the Shanghai datasets seen in Figures 4.4(a),(b) the results also show spreads
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Figure 4.2: Congress empirical mobility: global message spread σ averaged over ﬁve runs
with Bluetooth link settings for Prioritized (PR0.4 Λ
0.1k
2 , PR1.0 Λ
0.1k
2 ) and Ran-
dom (RD Λ0.1k2 ) peer syncs, and unlimited link settings for Λ
∞
max peer syncs.
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(a) Lausanne1.
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Figure 4.3: Lausanne empirical mobility: global message spread σ averaged over ﬁve runs
with Bluetooth link settings for Prioritized (PR0.4 Λ
0.1k
2 , PR1.0 Λ
0.1k
2 ) and Ran-
dom (RD Λ0.1k2 ) peer syncs, and unlimited link settings for Λ
∞
max peer syncs.
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(a) Shanghai1.
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Figure 4.4: Shanghai empirical mobility: global message spread σ averaged over ﬁve runs
with Bluetooth link settings for Prioritized (PR0.4 Λ
0.1k
2 , PR1.0 Λ
0.1k
2 ) and Ran-
dom (RD Λ0.1k2 ) peer syncs, and unlimited link settings for Λ
∞
max peer syncs.
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between 10%-18% for peer syncs with Bluetooth settings and are thus similar to the
results obtained from the Lausanne datasets, despite the fact that over 4000 nodes
participate in the network. The results with unlimited Λ∞max link settings reach 95%
ﬁnal spread, with a steep increase in the ﬁrst 50 rounds to 70% for Shanghai1 and
60% for Shanghai2. This is caused by the high connectivity of the Shanghai datasets
which exhibit a number of meetings per node that is about 9-10 times larger than
the ones of the Congress and Lausanne datasets.
To approximate how well link settings other than the introduced Bluetooth setting
can close up to the Unlimited setting, the hypothetical upper bound, a number of
varied link settings have been run for the Lausanne and the Shanghai datasets.
The Figures 4.5(a),(b) show the results for the Lausanne1 and Lausanne2 datasets
with varied link settings in comparison to the unlimited link settings. For the Λ2.5k2
link setting the ﬁnal message spread in Figure 4.5(a) for Lausanne1 is only slightly
better with approximately 11% for RD and 13% for PR0.4 than that of the Bluetooth
Λ0.1k2 results shown for Lausanne1 in Figure 4.3(a). Contrarily, Lausanne2 shown in
Figure 4.5(b) exhibits a signiﬁcant improvement of the ﬁnal message spread with the
Λ2.5k2 link setting compared to that of the Bluetooth Λ
0.1k
2 results in Figure 4.3(b): it
is now increased to approximately 18% for RD and 22% for PR0.4. Notably, the two
peer sync mechanisms RD and PR0.4 do not diﬀer much at the Λ
2.5k
2 link setting.
With a link setting adjusted to Λ10kmax the ﬁnal message spread with RD peer syncs
reaches around 30% in Lausanne1 and approximately 33% in Lausanne2. The PR0.4
peer syncs with Λ10kmax show a message spread that is closing up to the unlimited
Λ∞max link setting and which is signiﬁcantly better than the RD syncs of the same
link setting: for Lausanne1 it reaches around 46% and is only 8% lower than the
unlimited link setting. For Lausanne2 it closes at approximately 47% and is about
10% lower that the unlimited link setting result.
The Figures 4.6(a),(b) show the Shanghai1 and Shanghai2 message spread over
time with varied link settings compared to the unlimited link setting. With a link
setting adjusted to Λ2.5k2 and RD peer syncs the Shanghai1 ﬁnal message spread
shown in Figure 4.6(a) is at 31%, and the Λ2.5k2 RD syncs ﬁnal message spread
for Shanghai2 shown in Figure 4.6(b) is at approximately 35%. Compared to the
Bluetooth results of Shanghai1 and Shanghai2 depicted in Figures 4.4(a),(b) this is a
signiﬁcant improvement of message spread. Increasing the link setting to Λ10kmax does
not yield large improvements of message spread for RD peer syncs: for Shanghai1
the increase in message spread is only about 4%, and for Shanghai2 the increase is
approximately 3% compared to the Λ2.5k2 link setting.
With PR0.4 peer syncs and a Λ
2.5k
2 link setting, the message spread is again raising
and it is in the ﬁnal round at approximately 44% for the Shanghai1 dataset and at
approximately 53% for the Shanghai2 dataset. Adjusting the link setting to Λ10kmax
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Figure 4.5: Lausanne empirical mobility: global message spread σ averaged over ﬁve runs
with varied link settings for Prioritized (PR) and Random (RD) peer syncs and
unlimited Λ∞max link settings.
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Figure 4.6: Shanghai empirical mobility: global message spread σ averaged over ﬁve runs
with varied link settings for Prioritized (PR) and Random (RD) peer syncs and
unlimited Λ∞max link settings.
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yields  just as for the Lausanne datasets  a larger increase of the message spread.
The ﬁnal message spread is advancing to around 58% for Shanghai1 and to approx-
imately 68% for Shanghai2. Opposed to the Lausanne datasets the ﬁnal message
spread in the Shanghai datasets is not close to the hypothetical upper limit of the
Λ∞max link setting which is at about 95% for both of the Shanghai datasets. This is
the case, since the number of nodes in the Shanghai datasets amounts to more than
4300 nodes, approximately 31 times higher than that of the Lausanne datasets, and
the resulting message load on the network is also correspondingly higher. Appar-
ently, the throughput at the nodes is not managing that message load that well as
to facilitate higher message spread.
Concluding, it can be stated that the mobile microblogging using solely local point-
to-point links works well, i.e., it achieves a 75% ﬁnal message spread for suﬃciently
connected scenarios such as Congress1 and Congress2 with link settings adjusted to
Bluetooth. In the Lausanne datasets the bipartition of the network prohibits a ﬁnal
message spread above roughly 50%, even for the unlimited link setting, and in the
Shanghai datasets the transmission technology's bandwidth is the limiting factor,
resulting only in fair ﬁnal message spreads around 33% for higher-bandwidth Ran-
dom syncs and acceptable ﬁnal message spreads around 60% for higher-bandwidth
Prioritized0.4 syncs. However, with a higher bandwidth reasonable message spreads
can also be reached for the Lausanne and Shanghai datasets. Yet, the Shanghai
cases show that even with augmented link settings the completely decentralized mi-
croblogging using only peer syncs does not scale well. This shows that the system
works for small node numbers, and that it could also be deployed for larger ones if
communication technologies with a higher bandwidth were available.
To gain a broader understanding of the ways messages spread, there is the need to
conduct the simulations with synthetic movement patterns. This is the case, because
the empirical movement patterns exhibit the characteristics of speciﬁc homogeneous
groups, i.e., congress visitors, students and taxi drivers. These datasets could exhibit
a movement and connection pattern diﬀerent from that of datasets with heteroge-
neous users of cities. Therefore, to get more generalizable results, synthetic mobility
datasets which cover a wider range of densities, need to be studied as well. This
is particularly essential in order to discover focal points at which the microblogging
system might stop working.
Synthetic Mobility Data Results
The results after 500 rounds of simulation with Bluetooth link settings for PR0.4 and
Random peer syncs are shown in Figures 4.7(a),(b) for ManhattanGrid mobility.
For GaussMarkov mobility, this is shown in Figures 4.9(a),(b), respectively (cf. Sec-
tion 4.1.2 for the creation of the synthetic mobility data). Each ﬁgure shows a heat
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(b) ManhattanGrid: RD Λ0.1k2 .
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(c) ManhattanGrid: unlimited Λ∞max.
Figure 4.7: Synthetic mobility: ﬁnal round global message spread σ with Bluetooth link set-
tings in (a)(b) for Prioritized (PR0.4Λ
0.1k
2 ) and Random (RD Λ
0.1k
2 ) peer syncs,
and unlimited link settings in (c) for Λ∞max peer syncs.
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Figure 4.8: ManhattanGrid synthetic mobility: mean global message spread σ¯ with varied
link settings for Prioritized (PR) and Random (RD) peer syncs and unlimited
Λ∞max link settings. The square-shaped points at round 500 named 4.7(a),(b),(c)
show the σ¯-values of the correspondingly captioned heat map Figures for Man-
hattanGrid.
map of the ﬁnal global message spread σ under a ﬁxed sync strategy, for mobility
inputs with increasing node number on the x-axis and increasing area on the y-axis.
Random syncs for ManhattanGrid achieves a message spread of 70% for 25 nodes
up to an area of 25km2, and for 200 nodes for areas up to 5km2. GaussMarkov
only achieves this message spread for 25 nodes up to 5km2, and for 100 nodes up
to 3km2. PR0.4 shows higher message spreads: 70% spread is reached for 350 nodes
up to 10km2 in ManhattanGrid, and in GaussMarkov for 125 nodes up to 5km2.
GaussMarkov obtains a message spread close to 100% only for small areas and 25
nodes, whereas ManhattanGrid exhibits such a spread up to areas of 15km2 for 25
nodes, which then decreases to areas of up to 5km2 for 150 nodes. This shows again
that the microblogging works in smaller areas under Bluetooth link settings for node
numbers ranging from 25 to 150, but does not scale well for higher node numbers in
these areas, since bandwidth is the limiting factor.
The more densely connected mobility of ManhattanGrid leads to higher message
spread than the less structured mobility of GaussMarkov, and the selﬁsh PR0.4 peer
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(b) GaussMarkov: RD Λ0.1k2 .
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(c) GaussMarkov: unlimited Λ∞max.
Figure 4.9: Synthetic mobility: ﬁnal round global message spread σ with Bluetooth link set-
tings in (a)(b) for Prioritized (PR0.4 Λ
0.1k
2 ) and Random (RD Λ
0.1k
2 ) peer syncs,
and unlimited link settings in (c) for Λ∞max peer syncs.
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Figure 4.10: GaussMarkov synthetic mobility: mean global message spread σ¯ with varied
link settings for Prioritized (PR) and Random (RD) peer syncs and unlimited
Λ∞max link settings. The square-shaped points at round 500 named 4.9(a),(b),(c)
show the σ¯-values of the correspondingly captioned heat map Figures for Gauss-
Markov.
syncs similarly improve message spread over the Random peer syncs. Overall, the re-
sults are counter-intuitive: the observation of a degressive spread trend for increased
node numbers within the same area and thus higher node connectivity that does not
yield a better message spread is a sign for bandwidth as limiting factor beside the
mobility of the nodes. To conﬁrm this hypothesis, we perform experiments using
unlimited bandwidth.
Under unlimited conditions the ﬁnal results after 500 rounds of simulation are
shown in Figure 4.7(c) for ManhattanGrid and in Figure 4.9(c) for GaussMarkov.
The propagation of the messages is positively inﬂuenced for higher node numbers
in the same area as anticipated, resulting in a progressive message spread trend. A
spread close to 100% is reached in ManhattenGrid for 25 nodes up to areas of 20km2,
constantly increasing, so that from 200 nodes onwards full spread is achieved in areas
greater than 70km2. In GaussMarkov near 100% spread is reached in areas up to
7.5km2 for 25 nodes, and from 400 nodes onwards full spread is reached in areas
greater than 50km2.
62
4.3 Privacy and Security
To approximate how well link settings other than the introduced Bluetooth setting
can close up to the Unlimited setting, the hypothetical upper bound, a number of
varied link settings have been run. Figures 4.8 and 4.10 show the arithmetic mean
global message spread σ¯ over time for the synthetic mobilities, deﬁned as
σ¯ =
Σn∈NΣa∈Aσn,a
|N | |A| ,
with N = {25, 50, . . . , 400} being the set of node numbers, A = {1, 1.5, . . . , 70} the
set of areas, and σn,a the global message spread for the scenario with n nodes in an
area of a km2. For ManhattanGrid in Figure 4.8, the square-shaped points at round
500 named 4.7(a),(b),(c) correspond to the σ¯-values of the heat map ﬁgures of the
same name. For GaussMarkov in Figure 4.10, the square-shaped points analogously
correspond to the σ¯-values of the heat map Figures 4.9(a),(b),(c).
Overall, we see that, for PR0.4 peer syncs, the hypothetical upper bound can be
reached by a margin of approximately 2% for ManhattanGrid with Λ10kmax link settings
(and a margin of approximately 6% with Λ2.5k2 link settings). For GaussMarkov, the
margins amount to 8% and 12%, respectively. For Random (RD) peer syncs, the
hypothetical upper bound cannot be reached this well for both mobilities, and an
increase in link capacity from Λ2.5k2 to Λ
10k
max only yields a marginally better spread
(and for ManhattanGrid the ﬁnal values with Λ10kmax link settings are slightly lower
than with Λ2.5k2 settings). Random peer syncs result in nodes that indiscriminately
re-send duplicates of the same messages. For a higher message spread nodes should
therefore use Prioritized peer syncs.
In conclusion, we state that a major limiting factor for the propagation is the
capacity of the transmission channel, and not only the empirical/synthetic mobility
experienced by the nodes. The characteristics of the mobility patterns are an impor-
tant factor, e.g., node degree and meetings per node per day. For real world scenarios
the velocity of the nodes (and thus the resulting contact durations) has a signiﬁ-
cant impact on how the system works with a given technology: human movements
show longer contact durations than vehicular movements, with the latter asking for
technologies with fast connection establishment and high bandwidth. Especially
partitions of the network are a real bottleneck for the conducted peer sync simula-
tions, e.g., the Lausanne datasets with their strong bipartition. In general, it has
been found that prioritizing messages yields a better message spread than random
peer syncs and syncs with more than two peers per round does only yield better
spread for datasets with node degrees higher than two, e.g., the Shanghai datasets.
4.3 Privacy and Security
The goals of conﬁdentiality and anonymity are evaluated against a global passive ad-
versary monitoring all network communication (peer syncs). For censorship-resistance,
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Figure 4.11: Sender anonymity over time for empirical Congress (C1 and C2), Lausanne
(L1 and L2), and Shanghai (S1 and S2) mobility: given that a received message
has been created x rounds beforehand, what fraction of the total node number
on average could have been the sender.
we assume an adversary that can jam or spam the system.
4.3.1 Privacy and Anonymity
The P2P adversary introduced in Section 3.1.4 is not able to read any of the encrypted
messages, thus the system keeps conﬁdentiality. Receiver anonymity is achieved,
since message content and group memberships also remain conﬁdential from an ad-
versary which is unable to compromise nodes, so that the P2P adversary can only
hypothesize about possible senders and receivers of messages.
In order to experimentally evaluate sender anonymity, we assume the worst case,
namely a P2P adversary with global visibility (instead of the assumed local visibility)
who has monitored all peer syncs that took place, and who retrospectively tries to
identify the set of possible senders of a message assuming that the message was
created a speciﬁc number of rounds ago. The subsequently discussed ﬁgures are all
based on a link setting with two peer syncs per round to illustrate the achievable
levels of sender anonymity.
Figure 4.11 shows the sender anonymity over time for the empirical datasets.
Sender anonymity set fraction signiﬁes how many nodes on average could have sent
a message to a receiving node, assuming knowledge of the adversary that this message
has been created x rounds ago, e.g., for S2 60% of the 4445 nodes could have been
the sender after 50 rounds, whereas for L2 only 20% of the 137 nodes could have been
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Figure 4.12: Sender anonymity for synthetic mobility: the color indicates how many rounds
ago a received message would have had to be created, so that 80% of the total
node number on average could have been the sender  no color means this level
of anonymity can not be reached in the given scenario within the observed time
span.
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the sender after 700 rounds. Generally, we can observe that the underlying mobility
highly determines how fast sender anonymity increases. The high connectivity of
the Shanghai datasets thus yields a large possible anonymity set fraction after only
a few rounds, and the Lausanne datasets  due to their bipartitioned nature  yield
small anonymity set fractions, even after 700 rounds.
Figures 4.12(a) and 4.12(b) show a heat map for the synthetic datasets. The color
indicates the number of rounds needed to achieve sender anonymity set fractions of
80% with respect to the total number of nodes; no color indicates levels of anonymity
unobtainable within the illustrated upper bound of rounds, but possibly with a larger
one. The more connected the nodes are, the faster a high level of anonymity can be
reached. Overall, the achievable sender anonymity is closely linked to the underlying
mobility.
4.3.2 Censorship-Resistance
Censorship-resistance means that an active adversary is unable to stop the propa-
gation of messages based on their content, i.e., that in this case the system is not
rendered dysfunctional in terms of achieved message spread. To evaluate censorship-
resistance, we assume that the P2P adversary leverages his local visibility and inter-
nal participation (cf. Section 3.1.4) to either jam a fraction of the nodes per round
or to inject spam messages.
Jamming is an attack used to stop the peer syncs between nodes. The adversary
has the capability to limited local jamming, i.e., by the deliberate use of equipment
that creates radio noise that disables all close-by peer syncs that take place. Jammed
simulation runs are denoted by Jj , with 0 ≤ j ≤ 1 being the fraction of all nodes
which are each round randomly disabled from performing peer syncs.
Selected message spread results with J0.2, J0.5 and J0.8 simulation runs are shown
in Figure 4.13(a) for the Congress2 empirical mobility and in Figure 4.13(b) for the
ManhattanGrid synthetic mobility. The ﬁnal round message spread of Fig. 4.13(a) of
J0.2 is about 22% lower than the unlimited (Λ
∞
max) one. The subsequent ﬁnal round
diﬀerences amount to approximately 8% and 10% for J0.5 and J0.8, respectively,
totaling to a loss of around 40% in the J0.8 with respect to the Λ
∞
max run. The
synthetic ManhattanGrid results shown in Fig. 4.13(b) exhibit a ﬁnal round loss of
approximately 2% from its unlimited run, the subsequent losses being around 5%
and 15%, amounting to a 22% loss in J0.8 with respect to Λ
∞
max. Jamming thus
signiﬁcantly lowers the spread and the Congress2 mobility is more susceptible to
jamming. Yet, the microblogging system still exhibits suﬃcient message propagation.
Spamming is the injection of superﬂuous garbage messages into the network. The
spamming nodes' intent is a Denial-of-Service attack on the microblogging system,
since their bogus messages can not easily be ﬁltered out and create network load,
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which in turn decreases spread of legitimate messages. Spammed simulation runs are
denoted by Ss, with 0 ≤ s ≤ 1 being the fraction of nodes that are spammers. We
assume that all spamming nodes are not a member of any group and they peer-sync
by ﬁlling their send buﬀers with new spam messages each round. These messages
are indecipherable under any group key.
Selected message spread results are shown in Figure 4.14(a) for the Congress2
empirical mobility and in Figure 4.14(b) for the ManhattanGrid synthetic mobility.
The Congress2 ﬁnal round message spread in Fig. 4.14(a) is reduced from 74% to
47% when the regular PR0.4 Λ
0.1k
2 is run with S0.1 spamming (and reduced to 33%
with S0.4 spamming). The synthetic ﬁnal round results in Fig. 4.14(b) only show
losses of 8% and 5% with S0.4 spamming in comparison to the regular PR0.4 Λ
2.5k
2
and PR0.4 Λ
0.1k
2 runs, respectively. If Random was used as peer sync strategy, the
resulting message spreads would be lower.
In summary, the results of our conducted simulations show that the devised mi-
croblogging system can deal with a certain amount of jamming. However, the em-
pirical Congress mobility dataset is much more susceptible to jamming than the
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  100  200  300  400  500
σ
Round
Λmax∞J0.2 Λmax∞J0.5 Λmax∞J0.8 Λmax∞
(a) Empirical Congress2 mobility.
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  100  200  300  400  500
σ-
Round
Λmax∞J0.2 Λmax∞J0.5 Λmax∞J0.8 Λmax∞
(b) Synthetic ManhattanGrid mobility.
Figure 4.13: Jamming: selected jammed runs with unlimited (Λ∞max) peer syncs, with
Fig. 9(a) showing global message spread results for Congress2 and Fig. 9(b)
mean global message spread results for ManhattanGrid mobility.
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Figure 4.14: Spamming: selected spam runs with Prioritized0.4 (PR0.4) peer syncs, with
Fig. 10(a) showing global message spread results for Congress2 and Fig. 10(b)
mean global message spread results for ManhattanGrid mobility.
synthetic ManhattanGrid mobility dataset; here the former loses around 20% ﬁnal
message spread compared to the latter which loses only around 4% of the ﬁnal mes-
sage spread when a ﬁfth of the communication is jammed. This disparity is even more
prominent with respect to the robustness to spamming. In this case, the losses of
the ﬁnal message spread encountered are around 30% for the Congress dataset, even
when only a tenth of the nodes spam with Prioritized0.4 as sync strategy. Contrary
to that, the synthetic ManhattanGrid mobility has more robustness to spamming,
even if 40% of the nodes spam and Prioritized0.4 is used as sync strategy. Overall,
this shows that the system can not be fully stopped from propagating legitimate
messages, but a stronger robustness to spamming would be desirable.
4.4 Discussion
Since node mobility and the technology used for peer syncs are the foundation of the
microblogging system, these fundamental limitations of the system are addressed in
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Section 4.4.1. Section 4.4.2 concludes the discussion and the ﬁndings of this chapter.
4.4.1 Limitations of Privacy-Enhanced Microblogging
In a decentralized system the message propagation is based on the mobility of the
nodes in combination with the deployed peer-sync technology. If one group has sev-
eral clusters of member nodes moving in disjoint network partitions, their messages
will remain isolated within their respective partitions. The Lausanne dataset exhibits
a case with a possible message spread of around 50% due to an underlying bipar-
titioned network structure. In such cases more node movement, determined by the
underlying movement structures, or technologies that can conduct peer syncs over
a larger distance are required to bridge partitions. However, one could also argue
that the assignment to the groups in the Lausanne case was done without taking
into account potentially existing social structures reﬂected in the movement, so that
the resulting message spread was lower. Consequently, the system is considered to
work better in small city boroughs, cf. the ManhattanGrid and Congress cases, and
in scenarios with similar node movement patterns, i.e., the Shanghai cases.
4.4.2 Conclusion
It has been shown how a mobile distributed microblogging system allows to spread
messages by direct, proximity-based peer syncs in real-world conditions. One iden-
tiﬁed bottleneck are the available technologies: with Bluetooth only sub-optimal
message propagation is achievable, demanding for better suited technologies that
have both higher bandwidth and faster connection establishment. Prioritized mes-
sage propagation is preferable instead of Random syncs. With prioritization the mi-
croblogging system performs reasonably well under adversarial jamming and spam-
ming, thus showing the desired censorship-resistance, whilst maintaining message
conﬁdentiality and anonymity.
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Chapter5
Private Set Intersection Peer Syncs
This chapter investigates whether instead of prioritized peer syncs, where the nodes
draw a certain percentage of the messages to be put in the send buﬀer from groups
they are a member of, it is beneﬁcial for message spread if the nodes use Private
Set Intersection. By the use of Private Set Intersection the two nodes in a peer sync
ﬁrst privately determine their common groups, and then prioritize their common
group messages during peer syncs, i.e., put in their send buﬀer ﬁrst group messages
of groups both nodes are a member of. The hypothesis is, that these more target-
oriented prioritized peer syncs with Private Set Intersection lead to a higher message
spread of the system globally.
This chapter starts with a presentation of the cryptographic primitive of Private
Set Intersection in Section 5.1. In particular, the on-device implementation of a
speciﬁc Diﬃe-Hellman-based protocol is motivated based on the scenario require-
ments, including performance benchmarks of actual protocol runs. To evaluate the
hypothesis that deploying Private Set Intersection during peer syncs is beneﬁcial for
message spread, we experimentally investigate it with simulations. We present the
simulation results with Private Set Intersection peer syncs in Section 5.2, before we
draw a conclusion in Section 5.3.
5.1 Private Set Intersection
Private Set Intersection (PSI) is a cryptographic protocol that lets two parties who
both have their own sets of elements determine the elements they both have in
common (the intersection of their two sets), without revealing any elements to the
other party that are not in the intersection. Consider the case of Alice with her set
of elements A = {1, 2, 3} and Bob with his set of elements B = {2, 3, 4}. On Alice's
input A and Bob's input B, the protocol computes A∩B and outputs the set {2, 3}
to both parties. By running the protocol, Alice does not get to know anything about
the element 4 in Bob's set of elements, while Bob does not get to know the element 1
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in Alice's set of elements. With standard PSI protocols, the only knowledge gained
besides the intersection of elements is the number of elements each party has in its
set, i.e., |A| = 3 and |B| = 3. There are more complex PSI protocols that hide the
cardinality, meaning that no information leakage is revealed on the input set sizes of
Alice and Bob. However, a simple way to achieve this property is to set an upper
bound of elements per set and to let both parties pad their sets with dummy elements
until the upper bound of elements is reached. Then both parties have input set sizes
of the same size  the upper bound  and no information is leaked on their actual
input set sizes.
5.1.1 Protocols for Private Set Intersection
The protocols of PSI can be grouped into three classes: Garbled Circuit based pro-
tocols, Oblivious Transfer based protocols, and Public Key cryptography based pro-
tocols. Some protocols require a Trusted Third Party (TTP), and one could argue
that they constitute another class of PSI protocols. However, the requirements of
the microblogging solution described in this thesis do not allow for a TTP in the case
of PSI peer-syncing, and therefore protocols with a TTP are omitted in this study.
The remainder of this section shortly outlines these three classes of protocols based
on informal deﬁnitions and brieﬂy compares them.
Garbled Circuit Based PSI Protocols
Garbled circuit or generic secure computation protocols are based on either Boolean
or arithmetic circuits. [127] These circuits enable the secure computation of arbitrary
functions. They are mostly based on either Yao's garbled circuit protocol [134] or the
GoldreichMicaliWigderson protocol [53] in the case of Boolean circuits, and on the
Ben-OrGoldwasserWigderson [9] or the ChaumCrépeauDamgård [23] protocols
in case of arithmetic circuits. Numerous PSI protocols based on garbled circuits
have been proposed, and they experienced signiﬁcant performance improvements
over time. [98] Recently, in [62] several Boolean circuits have been proposed: the
simple bitwise-AND protocol uses a bit-vector representation of the input sets and is
instantiated by a binary AND gate 2s times, with s being the size of the set elements
in bits. Even though the complexity of this protocol grows exponentially with s, the
performance has been found to be best for values of s ≤ 16. The pairwise-compare
protocol uses a circuit that computes pairwise comparisons of the elements in the
two input sets. It has a worst-case complexity of O(n2), with n being the sizes of
the input sets, thus rendering it impractical for larger input sets. The sort-compare-
shue protocol is based on the idea that both parties ﬁrst privately and locally
sort their sets into a single sorted list, then comparing all neighboring elements for
equality, and ﬁnally shuing the intersecting elements to hide any leakage that could
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be obtained from the resulting positional information. This protocol has a complexity
of O(n log n), which is better than that of the pairwise-compare protocol and is thus
better suited for larger input sets. In [99] Pinkas et al. present a new circuit-based
PSI protocol which leverages new hashing algorithms and which only requires the
computation of ω(n) comparisons.
Oblivous Transfer Based PSI Protocols
This class of protocols makes use of the cryptographic primitive of Oblivious Trans-
fers (OT). The OT-primitive is, generally speaking, a two-party protocol, in which
Alice has a set of n messages a1, a2, · · · , an with indexes 1 ≤ i ≤ n and Bob queries
an index i from Alice at his own discretion. At the end of the protocol interaction be-
tween the two parties Bob receives ai without gaining any information about Alice's
other messages, whilst Alice learns nothing about Bob's queried index i (cf. [135]).
A way to eﬃciently create a large number of OTs is referred to as an OT extension
and was initially published in [64]. The basic idea is to instead of computing a large
number of OTs with slow public key operations, it is feasible to ﬁrst compute a
smaller number of base OTs. From these base OTs a larger number of OTs can be
derived solely by faster symmetric key operations, making OT extremely inexpensive
in practice. Recently, OT-based PSI protocols that make use of Bloom ﬁlters [12]
over an OT extension [72] have been proposed in [40, 73, 98].
Public Key Cryptography Based PSI Protocols
Asymmetric or public key cryptography is characterized by each user to have an
unique key pair, i.e., a public key that is usually not a secret and published, and a
secret or private key only known to the user, and that is generally kept as a secret by
the user owning the key pair. Public key based PSI protocols make use of public key
cryptography based protocols such as ElGamal [48], Pallier [92] and RSA [107], or the
Diﬃe-Hellman (DH) key exchange protocol [38]. PSI protocols based on ElGamal
are for example found in [17, 32, 59, 60], protocols based on the Paillier cryptosystem
can be found in [47, 71], protocols based on the RSA cryptosystem in [29, 31], and
protocols based on the DH key exchange in [63, 85].
Comparison of PSI Protocol Classes
Garbled circuit based PSI protocols can be built relatively easily by a programmer
with knowledge of circuits. Essentially, this is achieved by the use of software pack-
ages speciﬁcally made for the construction of garbled-circuit protocols [81, 82]. The
task at hand is then reduced to the design of a circuit that evaluates the function
to be computed. Garbled circuit protocols are also more modular than the other
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two classes of protocols, and the functionality of the protocols is simply extendable,
without the need to change the protocol and without aﬀecting its security. In the
case of PSI, it is straightforward to adapt a given PSI protocol to support additional
computations via the extension of the circuit with the wanted computational func-
tionality, e.g., the size of the intersection or the sum of the values of the items that
reside in the intersection.
For the other two classes oblivious transfer and public key based the task of
building a PSI protocol is more diﬃcult and regularly requires the knowledge of
a cryptographer, who has to design and implement the PSI protocol from scratch.
Also, extending these special purpose protocols for additional computations is more
diﬃcult and may possibly come at the cost of losing eﬃciency.
Since PSI is an active research ﬁeld, many proposals for PSI protocols exist. Gen-
eralized statements on the eﬃciency and performance of the vast number of suggested
protocols are thus diﬃcult to make, which is on the one hand further complicated
by the lack of implementations of many protocol designs. On the other hand, the
protocols that have been implemented and evaluated, were often benchmarked un-
der varying assumptions and observations, e.g., the protocol has been tested for the
total runtime while ignoring other important aspects such as the communication
complexity [100].
In [101] a cross-evaluation of selected PSI protocols belonging to the three classes
summarized above has been conducted. The communication and computation com-
plexity are among the main criteria used to evaluate the performance of PSI proto-
cols and all protocols have been implemented using the same programming language.
Also, the same cryptographic libraries have been used and the hardware remained
the same, thus allowing a fair comparison of the tested protocols.
Some of the main ﬁndings are that the communication complexity of the garbled
circuit based protocols is by far the highest among all tested protocols. The garbled
circuit protocols also have high computation complexity, even though their runtime is
smaller than the public key based protocols. The public key based protocols require
costly public key operations and they do not scale well with increased input set sizes;
however they have the best communication complexity of all the tested protocols.
Finally, the tested oblivious transfer based protocols have the smallest computation
complexity and are second best with respect to communication complexity, i.e., they
are up to ten times faster and have a communication complexity which is only about
two times higher than the tested public key based protocols (cf. [101]).
5.1.2 On-device Implementation of DH-PSI Protocol
The requirements of a PSI protocol useful in our setting are, that it is a two-party
protocol between parties A and B without any participation of a Trusted Third
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Party (TTP), not even during a setup phase before the actual protocol execution.
Also, the adversary model is the honest but curious model, meaning that the partic-
ipants are curious to ﬁnd out all they can about the secrets of each other, but they
do not deviate from the speciﬁed protocol run in any way. The input set sizes are
relatively small, i.e., with n being the cardinality of the input set sizes, its distribu-
tion would look approximately as follows, based on the observations made in [74]:
size of n is
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 ≤ n ≤ 100, in 99% of the cases,
100 < n ≤ 1, 000, in 0.99% of the cases,
1, 000 < n ≤ 10, 000, in 0.01% of the cases.
This means that in 99 out of 100 cases, the input set size is smaller than 100, and
only in 1 out of 10,000 cases is the input set size larger than 1,000 but smaller than
10,000. The protocol does not need to have the private set size hiding property, a
property that can also be achieved by dummy padding, but the protocol execution
should be fast on current smartphones.
Implementation of a DH-based PSI Protocol
We chose the protocol described in [63, 85] for inclusion into the private microblogging
solution, also in agreement with the recommendations made in [100]. The decision
to use this protocol is because of its fast computation runtime for the given set
sizes n and the best communication complexity of all tested PSI protocols in [100].
Both complexities scale linearly with the set sizes, i.e., O(n). The computation
complexity is costly due to the public key operations, but since the input set sizes are
comparably small, the runtime is exptected to be acceptably fast. More important
is the protocol's low communication complexity that is needed in the delay-tolerant
networking setting in which nodes may only be in communication range for a limited
period of time.
The protocol itself is DH-based and its basic matchmaking form, i.e., both parties
only have one secret element and they check if they are equal, has been published
in [85]. It involves only one secret by each party and it is subsequently shown as
a protocol between the two parties A and B. All calculations are performed in the
multiplicative group Zp. Party A possesses a as a secret, and party B possesses b as
a secret; both a and b are generators of the multiplicative group Zp. Both parties are
required to choose secretely and uniformly at random another element: A chooses
r ∈ Zp and B chooses s ∈ Zp.
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1. A→ B : ar
2. B → A : bs
3. A→ B : (bs)r(= brs)
4. B → A : (ar)s(= ars)
Similar to the Diﬃe-Hellman protocol for secure key exchange, it relies on the
observation that (XY )Z = XY Z = XZY = (XZ)Y . If A and B have a matching
element, both parties can verify this by the following calculations: A takes the value
received in step 4 and checks if it equals to the value A has send to B in step 3, and
B has to analogously check if the value received in step 3 equals to the value B has
sent in step 4. If this is the case, they have a matching value.
On-device Performance of the DH-based Protocol
The simple idea presented above can be extended into a practical PSI protocol, so
that it can accommodate the comparision of an arbitrary number of elements instead
of only one element. Instead of using the plain secrets as input, the hashed values
of the secrets are used as input. This is useful to map potentially large secrets to
a smaller value. Party A in this case has anA secrets a1, a2, . . . , anA, and party B
has bnB secrets b1, b2, . . . , bnB, all of which are used in their hashed form only. The
protocol is the following:
1. A→ B : H(a1)r, H(a2)r, . . . ,H(anA)r
2. B → A : H(b1)s, H(b1)s, . . . ,H(bnB)s
3. A→ B : H(b1)rs, H(b2)rs, . . . ,H(bnB)rs
4. B → A : H(a1)rs, H(a2)rs, . . . ,H(anA)rs
To check for the matching items, party A has to check which of the values received
from B in step 4 are equal to the values it has sent to B in step 3; conversely, party
B has to check for the values received from A in step 3 which equal to the values it
has sent to A in step 4.
This protocol has been tested on a Samsung Galaxy S5 mini with respect to
computation time, the results of which are shown in Table 5.1. The most costly
operations are clearly the modular exponentiations that need to be computed in
steps 1 and 3 of the protocol. They make up for almost all the computation time,
whereas the computation time needed for the initial hashing of the input elements
and the matching of the equal items at the end of the protocol run constitute only
for a small fraction of the total runtime. Note that the runtime of steps 2 and 4 is
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Number of input elements 10 100 1000
Hashing (SHA-256) runtime in ms 0,571 5,875 134,245
Step 1. runtime in ms 25,571 242,574 2 737,058
Step 3. runtime in ms 25,253 260,048 2 419,055
Intersection (matching) runtime in ms 0,214 0,727 2,417
Total runtime in ms 51,609 509,224 5 292,775
Table 5.1: Evaluation of PSI-protocol: average computation runtimes for the diﬀerent steps
needed during the protocol run and average total runtime in milliseconds.
essentially the same as the one for steps 1 and 3 of the protocol and therefore not
listed in the table.
Table 5.1 shows that the protocol is practical to use in case of small to medium
sets with total runtimes of about a twentieth of a second for input set sizes of 10
elements and about half a second for input set sizes of 100 elements. For large input
set sizes of 1000 elements the runtime amounts to approximately 5.3 seconds which
is still practical.
5.2 PSI-based Peer Sync Simulation Runs
The goal of this section is to evaluate whether the use of a peer-sync strategy based
on PSI improves message distribution. During a peer sync, two nodes ﬁrst perform
PSI to determine common groups, i.e., groups where both are members. They then
ﬁll a portion of their send buﬀer with common group messages of both nodes. This
new form of peer syncs is denoted as PSIp, with p being the fraction of send slots
which are reserved for common group messages. A node ﬁrst uniformly at random
selects from the common group messages and if this is not able to ﬁll all reserved
slots it uniformly at random selects from all other group messages. As for prioritized
syncing, the remaining fraction 1−p is ﬁlled randomly with messages of other groups.
5.2.1 Performance of PSI Syncs on Empirical Data
The global message spread results for PSI0.4 peer syncs for the empirical mobility
datasets are subsequently discussed in comparison to the Prioritized0.4 and Random
peer syncs, where the link settings are adjusted to Bluetooth, i.e., Λ0.1k2 . To give an
idea of the best possible spread, the upper bound for unlimited link settings, i.e.,
Λ∞max, is included as well (as in Section 4.2.2).
For the Congress1 and Congress2 empirical mobility datasets the global message
spreads over time are shown in Figure 5.1(a) and Figure 5.1(b), respectively. For
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the Congress1 empirical mobility dataset in Figure 5.1(a) the global message spread
with PSI0.4 syncs is evolving similary to that with PR0.4 syncs and is in the ﬁnal
round only approximately 6% lower than the PR0.4. The situation looks diﬀerent for
the Congress2 empirical mobility dataset in Figure 5.1(b). Here, the PSI0.4 curve
is evolving similar to the unlimitied Λ∞max curve, albeit with a much lower global
message spread. Also, the message spread is lower than that of the PR0.4 curve,
having a message spread in the ﬁnal round that is approximately 18% lower than
that of PR0.4, but still about 24% higher than that of RD syncs.
For the Lausanne1 and Lausanne2 empirical mobility datasets the global message
spreads over time are shown in Figure 5.2(a) and Figure 5.2(b), respectively. The
message spread in the datasets reached with Bluetooth link settings Λ0.1k2 are gener-
ally not very high. In Lausanne1 the spread with PSI0.4 syncs is slightly lower than
that of the PR0.4 and the RD syncs. However, the opposite is the case in the Lau-
sanne2 mobility dataset: here the global message spread with PSI0.4 syncs is slightly
higher than that with PR0.4 and RD syncs. Note that in all cases the simulation
results were averaged over ﬁve runs, thus preventing outliers.
For the Shanghai1 and Shanghai2 empirical mobility datasets the global message
spreads over time are shown in Figure 5.3(a) and Figure 5.3(b), respectively. In
the Shanghai1 dataset the global message spread with PSI0.4 syncs is similar to the
message spread with PR0.4 syncs and slightly above the message spread with RD
syncs. For Shanghai2 the results with PSI0.4 syncs are slightly below the message
spread with PR0.4 syncs, and they have about the same message spread as with RD
syncs.
5.2.2 Performance of PSI Syncs on Synthetic Data
In order to have a broader set of results and to test boundaries, we also run simula-
tions with PSI syncs on synthetic mobility data. The mean global message spreads
σ¯ for synthetic PSI0.4 peer syncs over time are shown in Figure 5.4 for the Manhat-
tanGrid synthetic mobility datasets and in Figure 5.5 for the GaussMarkov synthetic
mobility datasets.
For the ManhattanGrid mobility in Figure 5.4, the results for PSI0.4 Λ
0.1k
2 peer
syncs in round 500 are approximately 2% higher than the PR Λ0.1k2 peer-sync results,
and approximately 11% higher than the RD Λ0.1k2 peer-sync results. For the higher
link capacity setting of the PSI0.4 Λ
2.5k
2 peer syncs a mean global message spread σ¯
of 77% is achieved in round 500, and with PSI0.4 Λ
10k
max peer syncs the value of σ¯ in
round 500 amounts to 73%, meaning that the higher link capacity leads to a lower
message spread of approximately 4%. Furthermore, the PSI0.4 round 500 results
for Λ2.5k2 and Λ
10k
max peer syncs are signiﬁcantly lower than their corresponding PR0.4
peer-sync results (13% and 21% lower for Λ2.5k2 and Λ
10k
max, respectively), but their
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(a) Congress1.
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(b) Congress2.
Figure 5.1: Congress empirical mobility: global message spread σ averaged over ﬁve runs
with Bluetooth link settings for PSI (PSI0.4Λ
0.1k
2 ), Prioritized (PR0.4Λ
0.1k
2 ) and
Random (RD Λ0.1k2 ) peer syncs, and unlimited link settings for Λ
∞
max peer syncs.
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(a) Lausanne1.
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(b) Lausanne2.
Figure 5.2: Lausanne empirical mobility: global message spread σ averaged over ﬁve runs
with Bluetooth link settings for PSI (PSI0.4Λ
0.1k
2 ), Prioritized (PR0.4Λ
0.1k
2 ) and
Random (RD Λ0.1k2 ) peer syncs, and unlimited link settings for Λ
∞
max peer syncs.
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(a) Shanghai1.
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Figure 5.3: Shanghai empirical mobility: global message spread σ averaged over ﬁve runs
with Bluetooth link settings for PSI (PSI0.4Λ
0.1k
2 ), Prioritized (PR0.4Λ
0.1k
2 ) and
Random (RD Λ0.1k2 ) peer syncs, and unlimited link settings for Λ
∞
max peer syncs.
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Figure 5.4: ManhattanGrid synthetic mobility: mean global message spread σ¯ with varied link
settings for PSI, Prioritized (PR) and Random (RD) peer syncs, and unlimited
link settings for Λ∞max peer syncs.
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Figure 5.5: GaussMarkov synthetic mobility: mean global message spread σ¯ with varied link
settings for PSI, Prioritized (PR) and Random (RD) peer syncs, and unlimited
link settings for Λ∞max peer syncs.
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mean global message spread is still higher than their corresponding RD peer-sync
results (14% and 11% higher for Λ2.5k2 and Λ
10k
max, respectively).
For the GaussMarkov mobility in Figure 5.5, the results for PSI0.4 Λ
0.1k
2 peer
syncs in round 500 are approximately in between the results of the RD0.4 Λ
0.1k
2 and
the PR0.4 Λ
0.1k
2 peer syncs. Contrarily to the ManhattanGrid mobility results, the
GaussMarkov results for Λ2.5k2 and Λ
10k
max peer syncs are only about as high as the
RD peer-sync results, and accordingly much lower than the PR0.4 peer-sync results.
Similarly to ManhattanGrid, the higher link capacity from PSI0.4 Λ
2.5k
2 to Λ
10k
max leads
to a lower message spread of approximately 3% in the GaussMarkov mobility.
5.2.3 Discussion of the Results
The fact that the PSI peer-sync results are in most of the cases worse than the PR
peer-sync results is probably due to the fact that the pool of messages from which
the messages are drawn  the group intersections of the encountering node pairs  is
more limited than it is in the case of PR syncs. During PR syncs, messages of all the
groups the node is a member are eligible to be drawn from until the speciﬁed amount
of own group messages is reached. During PSI syncs, the set of eligible messages that
can be drawn from is smaller, since only messages from groups that both parties are
a member of can be selected. Also, groups with a high number of members could
potentially monopolize most of the send buﬀer slots, since these groups have a higher
probability to be shared by two nodes.
Therefore, to see whether it would make a diﬀerence in terms of message spread,
if a ﬁxed number of groups with a high number of members is excluded from the
PSI peer syncs, a number of simulations which excluded messages from the largest 8
and 16 groups from being considered in PSI peer syncs have been run. The results
for both the empirical and the synthetic mobility datasets were, however, consistent
with the ﬁndings described above, meaning that it did not have a measurable impact
on message spread.
Overall, the use of PSI peer syncs is not justiﬁed. The main reason is the observed
lower message spread during the simulation runs. However, another important reason
to defer from a use of PSI syncs is the required runtime of the PSI protocol. The
durations of node encounters may be short in real life, and the PSI calculations could
prolong the duration of a peer sync to that extent, that the exchange of messages
can not take place anymore due to an interrupted link. Additionally, the nodes can
not fully prepare their send buﬀer before the encounter, because the common group
messages can only be selected and put in the send buﬀer after the PSI protocol has
ﬁnished, thus further prolonging the PSI peer snyc.
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5.3 Conclusion
This chapter summarized the cryptographic primitive of Private Set Intersection and
outlined the three classes of protocols available, i.e., Garbled Circuit based protocols,
Public Key Cryptography based protocols, and Oblivious Transfer based protocols.
Motivated by the microblogging solution's needed properties, a simple Private Set
Intersection protocol based on the Diﬃe-Hellman key exchange was chosen and im-
plemented on smartphones in order to benchmark its performance.
The overall performance was satisfying, so that the protocol was also tested in the
simulation. Here, the results were dis-satisfactory, meaning that the simulation runs
with PSI peer syncs slightly underperformed the runs with prioritized peer syncs,
indicating that PSI peer syncs are generally not beneﬁcial over a strategy based on
prioritized selection.
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Chapter6
Privacy-preserving Oblivious RAM Server Syncs
The previous two chapters discussed a peer-to-peer microblogging solution that relies
on peer syncs only. This chapter will focus on the server syncs. At ﬁrst the basic
approach to server syncs from Chapter 3 is recapitulated and its shortcomings are
stated in Section 6.1, followed by the introduction of Oblivious RAM and its secu-
rity properties in Section 6.2. A new approach to server syncs using a multi-client
Oblivious RAM is given and evaluated in Section 6.3, and Section 6.4 concludes the
chapter.
6.1 Basic Approach
In the basic approach, described in Section 3.2.5, the server only functions as a passive
data dump from which chunks of messages can be queried and onto which messages
can be appended to. In principle, messages can be queried in two ways: the client
either downloads only parts of the messages stored on the server. In this case the
messages received do not include all messages and the client only gets a partial view
of all available messages. The client could also try to download the entire message
dump from the server. In this case  depending on the total amount of messages
stored on the server  the capacity of the link of the client to the server might be
insuﬃcient, the client could encounter a shortage of storage, and the decryption of
this amount of messages might become infeasible on a mobile device.
Both mentioned ways to access the server have manifold drawbacks. Since a passive
data dump has no intelligence implemented, nodes are not able to query messages
for a speciﬁc group they are a member of; group-oriented querying of messages is
thus not possible. Secondly, many duplicates of messages may reside on the server
 since the server must for privacy reasons not have access to any of the decryption
keys he cannot remove duplicates. And thirdly, in case of partial access the server
can see which part of the message store was accessed  even though the server is not
able to infer any group memberships of the clients from these queries, but only the
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messages queried by the nodes. (But he may still see that multiple clients access the
same set of messages.) To overcome these shortcomings of a basic passive data dump
residing on a server, a more advanced solution needs to be found for server-syncs. In
this chapter, we present an approach that is based on Oblivious RAMs.
6.2 Oblivious RAM
Informally, an Oblivious RAM (ORAM) enables a client to have read-write access on
an encrypted data structure residing on a server in such a way, that the client's access
pattern is concealed from the server. This is achieved by continuously shuing and
re-encrypting the data on the server, so that any two access sequences of the same
length become computationally indistinguishable. We give a review of the security
properties an ORAM has to oﬀer in Section 6.2.1 and then treat related work on
single-client ORAMs and multi-client ORAMs in Section 6.2.2 and Section 6.2.3,
respectively.
6.2.1 Security Deﬁnition of Access Pattern Privacy
We adopt the classic security deﬁnition for ORAMs as it is found in [124]. The
purpose behind an ORAM is that the server is not able to infer any information
from a client's access pattern to a database. Generally, no information leakage from
a client's accesses should take place, which particularly includes information such as:
• the data item that is being accessed;
• the last time a data item has been accessed;
• whether the same data item is being accessed (linkability);
• the order in which the data items are accessed, e.g., random or sequential; and
• whether the type of access is a read or a write.
More formally, the following deﬁnition of access pattern privacy describes the
security properties an ORAM must exhibit.
Definition (Access pattern privacy). Let y⃗ be a data request sequence of
length L of the form
y⃗ = ((op1, id1, dat1) , (op2, id2, dat2) , . . . , (opL, idL, datL)) ,
where each opi denotes a read or write operation, idi denotes the identiﬁer of the data
block being read or written, and dati denotes the data written. In this notation, index
1 corresponds to the most recent and index L corresponds to the oldest operation. Let
VIEW(y⃗) denote the sequence of all messages exchanged between the client and the
88
6.2 Oblivious RAM
remote storage induced by the sequence of data requests y⃗. An ORAM construction is
said to be secure if for any two data requests x⃗ and y⃗ of the same length, their views
VIEW(x⃗) and VIEW(y⃗) are computationally indistinguishable (cf. [69]) by anyone but
the client.
6.2.2 Single-client ORAM
First ORAM constructions were initially published by Goldreich [52] and Ostro-
vsky [90]. Yet, their research questions were diﬀerent in that they wanted to de-
vise a means of protecting software from piracy. Since then, a sizeable amount of
research has been conducted on proposing new and improving existing ORAM con-
structions [34, 50, 52, 54, 57, 58, 97, 115, 122, 124, 128].
The square root ORAM by Goldreich [52] was the ﬁrst ORAM construction to be
proposed. For this ORAM, the storage on the server consits of (N + 2
√
N) blocks.
The ﬁrst N blocks are encrypted blocks of the database, containing the actual data.
Additionally, there is extra storage amounting to 2
√
N blocks which is needed in
order to hide the access patterns whenever the same block is accessed more than one
time.
Hierarchical ORAM [54] requires the server to layout the data blocks into a hi-
erarchical structure based on levels. On each level the blocks are stored randomly,
the position being determined by a randomly selected hash function. From top to
bottom, each level contains an increasing number of hash buckets, with each hash
bucket containing log2N blocks. In [122] an improved hierarchical ORAM framework
is proposed which is based on the use of partitions. Each partition is treated as an
ORAM black box that provides a read and write operation whilst hiding the access
patterns within that partition. For each partition an actual ORAM construction
has to be chosen. In this way, an ORAM based on partitions is built by using this
generic construction.
Binary tree ORAM [115] organizes the server storage as a binary tree and every
data block is mapped to a leaf node selected uniformly at random  yet, it does not
strictly have to be stored at the leaf node. The data block is, however, always placed
at one of the nodes that belongs to the path from the root of the tree to the leaf
node it is mapped to in the binary tree. A position map is used by the client in order
to manage the index of the leaf node each data block is currently mapped to. Path
ORAM [124] is an optimized version of the binary tree ORAM.
A comparison of the performance of diﬀerent ORAMs in [21] shows that Path
ORAM is to date the most eﬃcient ORAM construction available.
Note that all mentioned constructions so far are in the client-server model: one
client outsources his data to one single server.
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6.2.3 Multi-client ORAM
The construction of multi-client ORAMs was initiated by Franz et al. [45], where
multiple clients store their data into one ORAM, and give each other access to parts
of it. Although this work pioneered further research in the ﬁeld, it suﬀers from
heavy communication costs, which make the solution diﬃcult to use in practice,
particularly in applications where the clients have very limited resources, such as
the scenario we are interested in. The work on multi-client ORAMs was further
addressed by Williams et al. [131], with the objective to enable access to a server
whilst keeping both the ﬁle content and the clients' accesses patterns secret. Their
major contribution is to support multiple ORAM clients.
Starting with [10], parallel ORAMs began to be further investigated, with mile-
stone works from Boyle et al. [16] and Raykova et al. [78]. These works however, are
in a diﬀerent setting than the one we are interested, as they assume that the whole
data stored on the remote server is accessible by every client. The multi-client con-
structions of Maﬀei et al. [79, 80] and Backes et al. [6] focus primarily on anonymizing
the queries from the eyes of the server, and leakage that can occur by allowing many
clients to access parts of the same data on a server is not dealt with (cf. Section 6.3.1
for the needed multi-client security properties in our setting).
6.3 Multi-client ORAM Server Syncs
In this section, we propose a solution that addresses the issues of the basic approach
to server-sync by using a multi-client ORAM to server-sync. It is not surprising
that privacy issues arise during the basic approach from Section 6.1 if messages are
selectively loaded from the server: for example, the server might learn the groups
to which a given client has access to, even if all the messages are encrypted. At
the same time, the server might learn  despite the fact that messages are stored
encrypted  if a speciﬁc message is of more interest than others, simply by observing
how many times this particular message has been accessed. If the basic approach
is used with the trivial method of simply loading the entire messages stored on the
server, it is likely to perform poorly due to inevitable limitations in networking and
computation capacities.
In order to remedy the aforementioned privacy leakages and the drawbracks de-
scribed in Section 6.1, we propose to outsource selected messages of the clients' data
in an ORAM data structure. Since all known ORAMs up to this date have to be cre-
ated with a constant storage size that can not be dynamically increased afterwards,
we create an ORAM that accomodates a ﬁxed amount of messages for a speciﬁc du-
ration, e.g., a day, a week, or a month, which is subdivided into message timeframes
of equal length. We address the above described privacy issues, while at the same
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time we do not require the clients to be constantly online, rather they only need to
go online in order to read the latest messages, or to write new ones.
The rest of this section is structured as follows. Section 6.3.1 extends the access
pattern privacy security deﬁnition for the multi-client ORAM scenario, before in
Section 6.3.2 the new multi-client ORAM construction for server syncs is presented
and its security is elaborated on. Finally, the performance of the ORAM construction
is evaluated in Section 6.3.3.
6.3.1 Security Deﬁnitions for Multiple Clients
In our setting, multiple clients store their data on an untrusted server. Unfortunately,
in such a multi-client scenario, simply plugging an ORAM construction onto the
server does not solve all privacy problems. In fact, it is interesting to observe that
by doing so, one actually transfers the leakage from the server to the client side: in
any ORAM construction, in order to read or write one data block, a client has to
access more blocks than the block that the client is actually interested in. Other
clients may examine this leaked information in order to gain information on the
queried content of a given client.
We work in a setting where every client belongs to various groups, and being a
member of a group, the client can read/write any block in that particular group.
This situation is exempliﬁed in Figure 6.1, that exhibits sample groups, clients and
the server hosting the ORAM.
Clients
ClientA
ClientB
ClientC
Server
Weather
Politics
Groups
Art
are members
of groups
ORAM
query
the server
Figure 6.1: Components of the ORAM-application.
The security guarantees that we wish to achieve in order to have privacy-preserving
server syncs, include making sure that each access to the ORAM  which consists of a
read or write operation on one data block of the ORAM  is guaranteed to be private
for every client against the server: the server should not be able to tell which block
has been accessed, but it also should not be able to tell if a block from a particular
group has been accessed. In total, the privacy of the access pattern, i.e., the sum of
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all individual accesses to the ORAM, has to be guaranteed for every client against
the server. In this thesis, we do not address the problem of client anonymity, i.e., the
server can potentially tell whether client A or client B has accessed the system.
However, as noted above, the server should not be able to tell whether a client is a
member of a particular group or not. Secondly, we want to guarantee that access
pattern privacy is achieved for clients who do not belong to the same groups. That
is, if client A belongs to the groups `Weather' and `Art' and he accesses a message
block from `Art', client B belonging to the groups `Weather' and `Politics' should
not be able to tell that an access to the group `Art' has been performed. If however
client A had accessed a message block from `Weather' (clients' A and B common
group), client B would have noticed it, but we do not treat this as leakage, as both
clients have complete access to that particular group (cf. Figure 6.1). (Note that
such leakage cannot be avoided, as each client may notice accesses by observing the
content of the blocks.)
In order to be able to argue about the aforementioned security properties, we have
to deﬁne them in a more precise way. For this, we adjust the deﬁnition of access
pattern privacy that is common in the ORAM literature, as it has been introduced
in Section 6.2.1:
Definition 1 (View). For a data request sequence of length L of the form
y⃗ =
((
op1, id
Gi1
x1 , datx1
)
,
(
op2, id
Gi2
x2 , datx2
)
, . . . ,
(
opL, id
GiL
xL , datxL
))
,
where opi is a read or write operation, idxi is the identiﬁer queried for, Gi is the
group to which the message block with identiﬁer idxi belongs, and datxi is the data
written, we call the VIEW(y⃗) (or access pattern) induced by y⃗, the sequence of all
messages exchanged between the client and the remote storage given the sequence of
data requests y⃗.
Definition 2 (Access Pattern Privacy against Server). A multi-client
ORAM is said to guarantee access pattern privacy against a semi-honest server, if
for any two data request sequences x⃗ and y⃗, the views VIEW(x⃗) and VIEW(y⃗) are
computationally indistinguishable by anyone, but the client who performed them.
Definition 3 (Access Pattern Privacy against Clients). A multi-client
ORAM is said to guarantee access pattern privacy for a client c against semi-honest,
non-colluding clients g, if for any two data request sequences x⃗ and y⃗ of c, on groups
that the clients g are not members of, the views VIEW(x⃗) and VIEW(y⃗) are compu-
tationally indistinguishable by anyone, but the client c who performed them.
6.3.2 Construction
In our scenario, we are limited by the computational capabilities of the clients in-
volved. Since the client in all ORAM constructions we are aware of is heavily involved
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in the ORAM protocol, we need to choose an ORAM that does not demand expen-
sive computations from the client. The most eﬃcient construction known to date is
Path ORAM of Stefanov et al. [124], which we use as a building block in our con-
struction. We thus brieﬂy describe Path ORAM in the following, then we present
our privacy-preserving multi-client Path ORAM and discuss how we integrate it in
our microblogging architecture, before we elaborate on its security.
Path ORAM
In Path ORAM a client stores N data blocks of size B on a server, in a binary
tree structure of height T = ⌈log2N⌉. Each node of the tree stores a constant
amount Z of blocks, all encrypted under a semantically secure encryption scheme.
Every block is uniquely identiﬁed by an identiﬁer id ∈ {1, . . . , N}. There exist real
blocks containing actual data and fake blocks that are assigned with no value, i.e,
an encryption of `0'. In the beginning, all blocks in the tree are initialized as fake
blocks. Every block is mapped to a leaf of the tree, and this mapping is written
in a so-called position map by the client. A read (or write) operation for a block
is performed by the client by downloading all the blocks along the path from the
root of the tree to the leaf indicated in the position map. The block's identiﬁer is
then randomly remapped to another leaf in the position map, and the client decrypts
all blocks found in the downloaded path. For all these blocks, the client checks its
corresponding leaf in the position map, and moves it (if there is enough available
space) to the node in the path which is closest to the leaf level and belongs both to
the downloaded path and the path to the leaf given by the position map (a process
called eviction). If a block does not ﬁt anywhere in the downloaded path, then
an extra storage called `stash' is used by the client to store this overﬂowing block
locally. The blocks found in the stash are also examined during every read (or write)
operation and checked if they can be evicted from the stash and placed in the tree1.
Once the client has examined all blocks found in the downloaded path and in the
stash, the client re-encrypts all the blocks in the path and uploads it to the server.
The protocol's security guarantee comes from the following observation: the server's
view consists of the leaf, the downloaded path (which the server sends to the client)
and the uploaded path (which the server receives from the client). Then, since the
leaf is randomly chosen by the client in every access, and the downloaded and up-
loaded paths are of exactly the same size, encrypted under a semantically secure
encryption scheme, any two views are computationally indistinguishable in the eyes
of the server.
1Since the stash must be stored locally by the client, the stash's size should be reasonably small;
in fact, in the paper's full version [121], the authors show that for any access pattern, the
probability that the stash exceeds a size of O(logN) is negligible.
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Multi-client Path ORAM
Our privacy-preserving solution for server-syncs needs an ORAM which is able to
accomodate multiple groups. A new multi-client ORAM construction based on Path
ORAM is in the following outlined. For simplicity, we call it PREaMBLe as in [68].
We consider multiple groups in which clients of the system store their message blocks.
For every group, the server holds N message blocks. Each of these message blocks
is uniquely identiﬁed by a speciﬁc timeframe. For example, the server will store
approximately 213 message blocks per group, given that each day is divided in 1024
timeframes of 85 seconds. Each message block can store up to Z messages (cf. Path
ORAM description above). Message block with id = 1 will correspond to the ﬁrst
timeframe (say Monday at time 00:00:00) and the message block with id = 213 will
correspond to the last timeframe (say Sunday at time 23:58:35). For each of these
groups, the messages are encrypted using a homomorphic, public key encryption
scheme that allows re-randomizations of the ciphertexts without knowledge of the
public key (cf. Section 3.2.2). Each group's messages are stored in an individual Path
ORAM structure, as described in Section 6.3.2. The blocks of each individual Path
ORAM are encrypted under a public/private key pair, which is known only to the
clients who are members of that group. The individual Path ORAMs of all groups
are concatenated together per node, forming the ORAM tree of our architecture (a
small example of the overall structure of the concatenated Path ORAMs containing
three groups with N = 4 messages is shown in Figure 6.2).
Observe that, since the same number of message blocks is used for every group, this
concatenation results in a binary tree of the same height as each of the individual
Path ORAM trees. For every group, a position map is created and again all the
position maps are concatenated, as in the PREaMBLe-tree.
A client accesses a group's message block (for reading or writing) in the same
way a classical Path ORAM is accessed. Here however, since in every node there
are also stored message blocks from other groups, which are not accessible by the
N
log N
: # of messages
: Group0
: Group1
: Group2
N
Figure 6.2: PREaMBLe containing multiple groups, each of them storing N messages.
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client, some extra steps have to be added in the protocol. The client ﬁrst consults
the group's position map to ﬁnd the leaf to which the queried message block  as
queried by its id that corresponds to a uniquely identiﬁed timeframe  is mapped.
The client then downloads the path to that leaf and decrypts the message blocks of
the group he is interested in  observe that this is easily doable, since the message
blocks of each group occupy ﬁxed positions within every node of the PREaMBLe-tree.
In one of these message blocks the client will ﬁnd all messages of the requested time
frame he is asking for. The client then performs the eviction algorithm (as in the
classical Path ORAM), only for the message blocks of the group he is looking at. After
the eviction is done, the client re-encrypts all the message blocks, that are in now
plaintext in the path, and re-randomizes all the message blocks he could not decrypt
 note that during this step, homomorphic encryption that allows re-randomization
without knowledge of the public key is required (cf. Section 3.2.2). The client ﬁnally
sends the updated path to the server.
Since accessing the PREaMBLe-tree is in essence an access to a Path ORAM tree,
the use of a stash cannot be avoided. Observe that the same identiﬁer of individual
groups will be mapped to diﬀerent leaves, e.g., idx of group `Politics' is mapped in
leaf y0, while with very high probability, idx of group `Weather' is mapped to leaf y1
(where of course y0 ̸= y1). Thus, each group will have a stash containing diﬀerent
identiﬁers. Note also, that since more clients are members of a group, storing the
stash locally on the client is not possible. We solve this problem, by ﬁxing the
stash size (something that can be done, by using the maximum stash size results
from [124]), ﬁlling it up with fake message blocks, and storing it encrypted per group
on the server. This way, every time a client accesses a message block on the server,
he downloads the concatenated group stashes and decrypts the one corresponding to
his group in order to use it for performing his eviction. At the end of the access, he
re-encrypts all elements of the group stash he operated on, re-randomizes all other
stashes, and uploads the entire stash to the server.
It is also important to describe how the position map is accessed. In the original
Path ORAM construction, the position map is stored recursively in smaller Path
ORAMs, using an idea ﬁrst described in [123], until a position map of constant
size is reached. The same idea can be applied in our construction as well: all the
intermediate position maps Path ORAM trees can be concatenated together; in every
access to the position map, the client decrypts the nodes he can, and before uploading
the path to the server, the client re-randomizes all nodes in every path.
From the above description it is easy to see that, since PREaMBLe is a concate-
nation of Path ORAM trees, the communication and computation complexity will
be similar to those of Path ORAM. Thus for a number G of message groups, a
client needs to have a total of G · O(logN) space available, in order to store the
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stashes during every query. The communication and computation complexities are
G ·O(log2N), thus linear in the amount of message groups available.
Integration of Multi-client Path ORAM for Server Syncs
So far, we introduced the Path ORAM cryptographic primitive as building block and
showed how we adapted it in order to be able to host multiple groups. This section
deals with the integration of the multi-client Path ORAM in the microblogging ar-
chitecture, so that users can server-sync utilizing the new ORAM construction. The
overall architecture with the ORAM server component can be seen in Figure 6.3.
Crowd A
Internet
movement
Crowd B
Node
ni
nj
nk
nl
nn
nk
no
nm
ORAM
Server synchronization
Node movement
Peer synchronization
Figure 6.3: Schematic overview of the architecture with the added ORAM server component.
As stated, an ORAM has to be of a ﬁxed size and the communication and compu-
tation complexities of the multi-client Path ORAM increase linearly with the number
of groups it hosts (cf. Section 6.3.3 for an evaluation). Therefore, it is not practical
to operate one monolithic ORAM that hosts the messages of all groups for a pro-
longed period of time. Instead, multiple ORAM instances need to be run on the
server with each one containing a certain amount of groups, e.g., 10, 200 and 500,
and accomodating the messages created over a uniquely speciﬁed period of time,
e.g., a day, a week, a month. Periodically, new ORAMs thus need to be created.
Subsequently, we discuss the setup, the access, and the privacy implications of this
use of multiple ORAMs.
Setup: For simplicity, let us assume that the setup policy is to weekly create ORAMs
that each contain a ﬁxed number of groups. Each day is divided in 1024 timeframes
of 85 seconds and message block with id = 1 will correspond to the ﬁrst timeframe
on Monday at time 00:00:00 and message block with id = 213 will correspond to
the last timeframe on Sunday at time 23:58:35. The users know this policy and can
identify messages by their speciﬁc timeframe id. The missing information is which
groups will reside on each ORAM. Prior to the setup of the next week's ORAMs,
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the server is in an advertisement phase during which it maintains a list of groups
that are to be included for the upcoming ORAMs to be created. The list is made of
ElGamal encryptions of the neutral element 1, encrypted under the public group keys
of the participating groups. Starting with an empty list, it is sequentially expanded.
The ﬁrst user queries the empty list from the server. For each of the groups he is
a member he decides if he wants to add it or not. If he wants to add a group, he
appends an ElGamal encryption of the element 1 encrypted under the respective
public key of the group to the list. He then re-uploads the list to the server. Each
subsequent user adds new groups to the list in the following way: ﬁrstly, he decides
on the groups he wants to add. Then he queries the list from the server, and checks
by brute force for each item on the list, if it decrypts to 1 utilizing the private key of
any of the groups he wants to add. In case of success, the group is already present
in the list and does not need to be added again. In order for the server to be unable
to link which item has been added by the user to what position in the list, the user
ﬁrst re-randomizes all existing encryptions of 1, then shues the obtained items in
a new random order, and the encryptions of 1 for the remaining groups he wishes
to add to the list are inserted in the list at random places (the re-randomization of
existing encryptions of 1 does not require knowledge of the respective groups' keys,
cf. Section 3.2.2). Finally, the altered list is re-uploaded to the server. At the end
of this advertisement phase or after the reach of a threshold number of accepted
groups, the list of groups is closed by the server and can not be changed anymore.
The server subdivides the closed list into sublists that each contain the ﬁxed number
of groups. (Any remaining groups are equally distributed on the created sublists.)
For each sublist the server is able to initialize an empty ORAM, so that a distinct
number of ORAMs  determined by the ﬁxed number of groups  is created.
Access: A client accesses message blocks by their uniquely identifying timeframe.
He ﬁrst queries the server for the available time periods. Upon the ﬁrst use of any
time period, the client has to download the sublists of all the ORAMs created for
it. By brute force for each item on the list he checks, if it decrypts to 1 utilizing the
private key of any of the groups he is a member of. After this is accomplished, the
client knows which of the groups he is a member of are present in which ORAM in
the queried time period and at which position within the PREaMBLe-tree, since the
message blocks of each group occupy ﬁxed positions within every node of the tree.
At this stage, the speciﬁc PREaMBLe-tree that needs to be accessed is known to the
user and he can access the message block as described above in the subsection on
Multi-client Path ORAM.
Privacy : This use of a distinct number of ORAMs each hosting a speciﬁed number of
groups, however, has privacy implications. Ideal from a privacy point of view would
be to have all groups hosted in one ORAM, so that a user accessing this ORAM
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could potentially be a member of any one of all existing groups. This potential set of
groups decreases for a smaller number of groups hosted on an ORAM, yielding some
leakage on possible group memberships for the user. Yet, the computations needed
to be performed by a user to access an ORAM increase linearly with the number of
groups hosted on it. Therefore, privacy trade-oﬀs have to made so that the ORAMs
allow for enough privacy by hosting a suﬃciently large number of groups while at the
same time still being practical to be accessed by users of computationally constrained
mobile devices (cf. Section 6.3.3).
Security
In this section, we analyze the security of PREaMBLe. We show that access pattern
privacy is guaranteed both against the server but also against clients who do not
belong to the same groups. This we show in the following propositions.
Proposition 1. PREaMBLe achieves access pattern privacy against a semi-honest
server.
Proof. We ﬁrst argue about access pattern privacy against the server: for two data
request sequences x⃗ and y⃗ the server sees VIEW(x⃗) and VIEW(y⃗). Each of the views
consists of tuples of the form
(leaf,Pathsent,Stashessent,Pathgot,Stashesgot),
where leaf marks the path from the root of the tree, Pathsent is the path containing
encrypted nodes that the server sent, Stashessent are the encrypted stashes the server
sent, Pathgot is the path containing freshly re-randomized nodes that the server
received from the client, and Stashesgot are the freshly re-randomized stashes that
the client sent. Since the leafs are randomly chosen by the client and are independent
of the identiﬁers in x⃗, the leafs in the two views are indistinguishable. The paths
(both the ones sent from the server and received from the server) are of the same
length and encrypted under a semantically secure encryption scheme, thus they are
also indistinguishable in the two views. Recall now that the stashes are of the same
(ﬁxed) size as we discussed in the previous section, they are sent encrypted from the
server, and re-randomized when they are sent back to the server. Then, due to the
semantic security of the encryption scheme, the stashes are also indistinguishable in
the two views. Consequently, the views are computationally indistinguishable in the
eyes of the server.
Arguing about the access pattern privacy against the client is done in a similar
way as with the server. However, extra care has to be taken, since in the views, there
will appear message blocks that a semi-honest client will be able to decrypt.
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Proposition 2. PREaMBLe achieves access pattern privacy against semi-honest
non-colluding clients.
Proof. Suppose clients A and E are both members of a PREaMBLe instance, and
client A performs two data request sequences of length L
x⃗ =
{(
op1, id
Gi1
x1 , datx1
)
, . . . ,
(
opL, id
GiL
xL , datxL
)}
and
y⃗ =
{(
op1, id
Gj1
y1 , daty1
)
, . . . ,
(
opL, id
GjL
yL , datyL
)}
,
such that E is not member of the groups (Gi1 , . . . GiL , Gj1 , . . . , GjL). Similar to the
proof of the access pattern privacy against the server before, we examine the views
induced by these data request sequences. Again the views will be of the form
(leaf,Pathsent,Stashessent,Pathgot,Stashesgot)
and as far as leaf is concerned, the same argumentation as in the case of the server
is applicable here. Nonetheless, in Pathsent and Pathgot, there will be message blocks
which client E will be able to decrypt. Yet, recall that during the eviction client A
does not change the place the blocks are stored within a tree node. Thus, all the
message blocks that client E can decrypt, remain in exactly the same positions in
both Pathsent and Pathgot in both views, and so they are indistinguishable in the two
views. Note also, that in Pathsent and Pathgot the paths from the recursive access
to the position map will also be found, but with a similar argument, they will also
be indistinguishable in the two views. The same holds for the stashes in Stashessent
and Stashesgot: client E can decrypt some of them, however they will not have been
changed during the two accesses, and so they will be indistinguishable in the two
views. The above observations lead us to the conclusion that the two views are
indistinguishable in the eyes of client E.
6.3.3 Evaluation
As we have seen in Section 6.3.2, the computation complexity of PREaMBLe is linear
in the amount of groups present in the system, and thus it will be governed by the
amount of encryptions, decryptions and re-randomizations that have to be performed
in every query. We implemented these necessary operations in C++ using arm-g++
4.9 and openssl 1.1.0 for the cryptographic library and tested the operations on
a Samsung Galaxy S III. Table 6.1 shows the estimated time needed for a query in
various instantiations of PREaMBLe. We set the plain message size to 128 bytes and
used an elliptic curve with 256 bits to encrypt the messages. We allowed 85 second
time-frames that resulted in a total of 1 024 blocks per group. We instantiated 10,
200 and 500 groups. We chose these values because we argue that the achieved level
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ORAM stores mes- Number of Time in
sages of a groups seconds
day 10 1.94
day 200 3.41
day 500 4.73
week 10 33.66
week 200 58.88
week 500 82.71
month 10 83.76
month 200 146.76
month 500 205.78
Table 6.1: Evaluation of PREaMBLe: estimated time in seconds needed for an access to an
ORAM storing messages for a day, a week and a month depending on the number
of groups hosted on the ORAM. The day, week (7 days), and month (30 days)
are each subdivided in 85-second timeframes resulting in 1 024, 7 168 and 30 720
message blocks, respectively.
of privacy is suﬃcient in case of 200 groups hosted on an ORAM (and even better
in the case of 500 groups). The number of 10 groups is included for comparison,
albeit the privacy would be insuﬃcient with such a small number. For these group
numbers, we tested PREaMBLe constructions that store message blocks for a day
(1 024 message blocks), for a week (7 168 message blocks) and for a month (30 720
message blocks).
Our estimations show that using 10 groups, the query time ranges from 1.94 s (stor-
ing message blocks for a day) to 83.76 s (storing message blocks for a month). When
200 groups are present, the query time ranges from 3.41 s (storing message blocks
for a day) to 146.76 s (storing message blocks for a month). Lastly, an instantiation
with 500 groups, results in query time ranging from 33.66 s (storing message blocks
for a day) to 205.78 s (storing message blocks for a month). The above results show
that our scheme can be eﬃciently implemented, even with larger group numbers.
In order to test the applicability of our solution, we also measured the battery drain
in the various cases mentioned above. The results are shown in Figure 6.4, where we
see that the power consumption is both dependent on the number of message blocks
stored, and the number of groups present. Our measurements showed that even with
500 groups present, storing messages for 30 days in 85 s time-frames, one access to
the ORAM server consumed approximately 0.084% of the battery, thus yielding a
practical and eﬃcient construction.
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Figure 6.4: Battery drain due to one access to PREaMBLe holding 1 024 message blocks (1
day with 85-second timeframes), 7 168 message blocks (7 days with 85-second
timeframes), 30 720 message blocks (30 days with 85-second timeframes), each
holding message blocks for 10 groups (left bar), 200 groups (middle bar) and 500
groups (right bar). For instance, the computationally most expensive access with
500 groups and 30 720 message blocks consumed approximately 0.084% of the
battery's capacity.
6.4 Conclusion
To the formerly peer-to-peer network we added a more advanced server component
that hosts the concatenation of multiple Path ORAMs, so that clients can go online
in order to read messages from or to write messages to the ORAM. Thus the clients
are able to privately write messages to and read messages from the server component
based on their group memberships and in this way they can achieve a higher message
spread in a shorter time span. The ORAM server component added to the formerly
pure peer-to-peer network also allows the messages to spread between segmented
client clusters (cf. the Lausanne datasets empirical results in Section 4.2.2), while
at the same time the clients' privacy is maintained, as the server cannot make any
correlation between accesses of diﬀerent clients. This way, the clients do not disclose
their group memberships or the data accessed, neither to the server nor to other
clients that do not have access to the same groups.
In total, the solution is practical for this microblogging application and it should
be deployed, since clients need only be online when they want to interact with the
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server. The server hides the inter-group access patterns and only the intra-group
access patterns are seen by the members of singular groups. The communication
bounds, the client-side data storage and the client-side computations needed are
practical and the evaluation of this new component for ORAM server-syncs showed
that it can be run on current mobile devices such as smartphones.
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Conclusion
This thesis introduced a novel form of mobile privacy-enhanced microblogging. The
aim of privacy-enhanced microblogging is to allow mobile users to send encrypted
microblogging messages in an anonymous, conﬁdential, censorship-resistant and de-
centralized way.
To that end, at ﬁrst microblogging was introduced in the context of online social
networking, followed by the treatment of related work. Then the microblogging
solution was described with its core functional components, including infrastucture
and system overview, message format and storage, the used encryption scheme, group
and key management, message format and storage, and the devised synchronization
mechanisms of peer-syncing and server-syncing.
The devised mobile microblogging system was then thouroughly tested using simu-
lations in its pure peer-to-peer format, which uses only peer syncs alongside with the
strategy of prioritized message synchronization  the send buﬀer contains a fraction
of own group messages  and random message synchronization  the send buﬀer is
ﬁlled randomly out of all locally stored messages. As input to the simulation served
a number of empirical and synthetic mobility datasets. They were used to cover
a wide range of mobile user movement patterns and situations. Since user mobil-
ity alongside with the used message synchronization strategy are the drivers behind
message spread, the resulting message spread diﬀered signiﬁcantly in the diﬀerent
scenarios tested: the message spread was high in well-connected networks, even if
it contained only few nodes, e.g., the Congress datasets, but message spread suf-
fered signiﬁcantly in the case of network segmentations, e.g., the Lausanne datasets.
Generally, a prioritized messages synchronization strategy yielded a better message
spread than a random synchronization strategy. Finally, the capacity of the trans-
mission channel was a major limitating factor for message propagation, regardless of
the given mobility dataset.
In contrast to well-known anonymity solutions such as crowds and mixes, which
speciﬁcally address uni-cast routing for session-oriented ﬁxed-line web communica-
103
7 Conclusion
tions, privacy-enhanced microblogging uses universal re-encryption instead of a lay-
ered one and it is deployed in a delay-tolerant mobile networking scenario. In the
purely decentralized system the messages spread without routing overhead using di-
rect communications only (peer syncs). As a result of these design decisions required
for anonymity, the microblogging system exhibits a delayed spread of messages on
a best eﬀort basis. Yet, these limitations are to be taken into account if the stated
security and privacy goals are to be met, as they are with this solution.
To investigate if a synchronization strategy that ﬁlled the send buﬀer with a frac-
tion of common-group messages of the two peer-syncing users yields better results,
the use of the cryptographic primitive of Private Set Intersection (PSI) was pro-
posed, and a speciﬁc protocol suited for the given application context was chosen
and showed to be eﬀectively usable. The simulations were then conducted using PSI
peer synchronizations, but showed only mixed results that did not outperform the
prioritized peer-syncing simulation runs.
To alleviate the mentioned design limitations of delayed and only best eﬀort mes-
sage spreading in the purely peer-to-peer based operation of the privacy-enhanced
microblogging system, the so far only simple mechanism for server synchronization
 with the server as a passive data dump that can not be queried target-orientedly 
was replaced with a more sophisticated solution based on an altered version of a Path
Oblivious RAM (ORAM) which allowed the users to query their group encrypted
messages eﬃciently and privately, without the server or other users knowing which
message has been read or written.
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